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ABSTRACT
The multiple objectives of boosting food production, 
generating employment, raising incomes and improving welfare could 
naturally be achieved by small farmers in the Philippines if all the 
resources required - including manpower, material and capital - were 
made available to them. In practice, unlimited support for the 
agricultural sector is not available from the government, so effective 
agricultural production programs need to be devised.
This thesis reviews some agricultural credit schemes in 
developing countries - including the Philippines - that have been 
introduced to promote agricultural development, particularly increased 
production and improved welfare. This study then attempts to evaluate 
the Masagana 99 Rice Production Program in the Philippines and examines 
some of the problems that have affected program implementation.
The results indicate that the Masagana 99 Rice Production 
Program did have some positive effects on production and has been 
moderately successful. It is still rather early to draw firm conclu­
sions at this stage, but it appears that the M-99 program not only 
contributed to increased production but also generated employment 
thus improving small farmers' income in general.
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ACA = Agricultural Credit Administration
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IRRI = International Rice Research Institute
LB = Land Bank of the Philippines
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MAT = Municipal Action Team
MIS = Management Information System
M-99 = Masagana 99
NAGS = New Agricultural Credit Scheme (Sri Lanka)
NEDA = National Economic and Development Authority
NFAC = National Food and Agricultural Council
NGA = National Grains Authority
NIA = National Irrigation Administration
NMC = National Management Committee
NMPC = National Media Production Center
PAG = Provincial Action Committee
PC = Philippine Constabulary
PCAR = Philippine Council for Agricultural Research
PNB = Philippine National Bank
PPOs = Provincial Program Officers
PTs = Production Technicians
= Pesos
RBs = Rural Banks
Re = Rupees
REAP = Rural Banks Associations of the Philippines
STDS = Special Time Deposits
UPLB = University of the Philippines at Los Banos
USAID = United States Agency for International Development
TBAC = Technical Board for Agricultural Credit
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WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
1 hectare (Ha.) 
1 metric ton
1 cavan
2.47 acres 
1,000 kilograms (Kg) 
2,205 pounds 
44 kilograms
The Exchange Rate used^is the official selling rate used in 1976
1 peso (J?) $A0.125
$US0.134
PHILIPPINE CROP YEAR (CY) AND FISCAL YEAR (FY)
July 1st - June 30th
DEFINITIONS
Paddy = Rough rice or Palay
Samahang Nayon = barrio associations
Selda joint-liability groups
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1CHAPTER 1
THE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE 
IN THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY
1.1 Brief Scope of Agriculture
Agriculture plays a significant role in the Philippine economy. 
It accounts for about one-third of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and one- 
half of total employment in the country (Tables 1.1 and 1.2). At present, 
two-thirds of export earnings are derived from agriculture (Table 1.3).
As such, it is essential that the agricultural sector should stimulate 
other sectors of the economy, especially in areas which could raise 
the present levels of total production and export earnings, so that more 
employment could be generated. To achieve this, there is an urgent need 
to "revolutionize" the agricultural sector through a substantial amount 
of assistance from the government in the form of extension services, 
marketing, credit, infrastructure projects such as water resources, trans­
portation, power and electrification, and other related projects.
1.2 The Precious Grain Called "Rice"
Rice, the staple food, has long occupied an important position 
in the agricultural sector.
In 1972, the total population of the Philippines was about 
38 million, which was the sixth largest population in Asian countries
1 in 1975, the total population was reported to be 4.15 million with a 
rate of growth of 2.8 per cent (World Bank Country Economic Report, 
1976).
2TABLE 1.1
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, NATIONAL INCOME AND NET 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN, CY 1972-1974 
(at current prices)
Industry/
Item
1972
Value in
M. Pesos
%
1973
Value in
M. Pesos
%
1974
Value in
M. Pesos
%
1. Agriculture,
Fishery & Forestry 16531 35.9 20004 35.3 28477 36.0
2. Mining and Quarrying 1051 2.3 1693 3.0 2154 2.7
3. Manufacturing 8979 19.5 12260 21.6 10564 24.8
4. Construction 1262 2.7 1411 2.5 1891 2.4
5. Transportation,
Communication, Storage 
and Utilities 1651 3.6 1955 3.4 2574 3.3
6. Commerce 6823 14.8 8266 14.6 11124 14.1
7. Services 9731 21.1 11124 19.6 13229 16.7
8. NET DOMESTIC PRODUCT
at factor cost
Net factor income 
from abroad
46028
(865)
100.0 56713
(450)
100.0 79013
(553)
100.0
9. NET NATIONAL PRODUCT 
or National Income 45163 80.8 56263 80.3 79566 80.4
10. Indirect Taxes net of 
Subsidies 4350 7.8 6179 8.8 8818 8.9
11. Capital Consumption 
Allowance 6349 11.4 7583 10.8 10560 10.7
12. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
or GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT (GDP) 55862 100.0 70025 100.0 98944 100.0
Source: NEDA, The National Income.Accounts, 1972 to 1974, Manila, 1975.
3TABLE 1.2
EMPLOYED LABOUR FORCE IN AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL 
SECTORS, PHILIPPINES, FISCAL YEARS 1966-68a
Employed
1966 1967 1968
'000 % '000 % '000 %
Agricultural 6275 56.9 6361 57.4 6366 57.1
Non-Agricultural 4757 43.1 4728 42.6 4780 42.9
Total Employed 11032 100.0 11089 100.0 11146 100.0
a The labour force refers to the population 
over, who are either employed or seeking
, 10 years old 
employment.
and
Source: "Economic Report, 1968 ", Philippine Economy Bulletin,
Vol. 5, No . 6, 1968.
TABLE 1.3
VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND SHARE OF TOTAL EXPORTS3
1960 1965 1970
Value % Value % Value %
Products
Coconut 179 31.9 270 35.2 209 19.7
Forest 102 18.2" 195 25.4 295 27.8
Sugar 143 25.5 147 19.1 196 18.4
Others 54 9.6 45 5.8 44 4.1
Total Agriculture 478 85.2 657 85.5 744 70.0
Mineral Exports 61 10.8 77 10.0 224 21.1
Total Agriculture 539 96.0 734 95.5 968 91.1& Mineral Exports
Other Exports 21 4.0 34 4.5 94 8.9
All Exports 560 100.0 768 100.0 1062 100.0
a Total value in million dollars F.O.B.
Source: Sicat, New Economic Directions in the Philippines,
National Economic and Development Authority, Manila, 1974.
4and fifteenth largest in the world (Sicat, 1974). Of this 38 million, 
76.8 per cent were classified as "rice eaters" (Mears and others, 1974). 
The rice industry is a direct source of livelihood for about a quarter 
of the population (BSC, 1965). Canlas (1973) has pointed out that the 
rice industry has increased its output by about 3.5 times from 1910 to 
I960, but this period has been characterized by relatively low national 
average yields and a sl'tiwly evolving technology. Productivity in the 
rice industry is low and yields lag far behind those in most other Asian 
countries such as Burma, Republic of Korea, China, Indonesia and 
Thailand, notwithstanding some success stories in "miracle" rice 
varieties (Table 1.4).
TABLE 1.4
AVERAGE ANNUAL YIELDS OF ROUGH RICE (PADDY) IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES, IN METRIC TONS PER HECTARE
Country 1961-65 1966-70 1971-73
Burma 1.64 1.64 1.70
Korea, Republic of 4.11 4.31 4.68
China, People 1s 
Republic of 2.78 2.93 3.14
Indonesia 1.76 1.91 2.30
Thailand 1.78 1.82 1.90
Philippines 1.26 1.51 1.53
All-Asia Average 2.05 2.17 2.32
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook,
1972 and 1973 (Rome: FAO).
51•3 Rice Production Programs
The Philippine government, in line with its policy of attaining 
seIf~sufficiency in food production, particularly rice, has long been 
exerting efforts to formulate and implement a successful rice production 
program. In 1968, the country seemed to be rewarded when rice production 
was sufficient to meet consumption requirements and imports were not 
needed. This "sufficiency" however, was shortlived. During the crop 
years 1971, 1972, and 1973, Philippine rice crops were severely damaged 
by diseases and poor weather. The 1971-72 rice crop was affected by 
Tungro, a virus disease spread by the Green Leafhopper, resulting in 
about 4 per cent less production than the year before (Table 1.5).
A catastrophic flood hit Central Luzon during July, August, and September 
of 1972 which severely affected the crop in Central Luzon, the rice bowl 
of the Philippines. This was followed by a drought preventing the 
recouping of the earlier losses. The 1972-73 crop was 13 per cent lower 
than the crop of the year before.
The crucial question therefore is: "How can the Philippines 
offset these losses and boost rice production to meet its needs?"
There seem to be two alternatives. Firstly, the Philippine government 
could concentrate its efforts in opening up new lands for rice 
cultivation.1 However, bringing this land into use entails a large 
capital outlay and a pioneering spirit notwithstanding the probability 1
1 In 1974, the Philippine government launched "Palayan ng Bayan", 
a program designed to locate and open up virgin lands and put them 
into cultivation. This program also supports the M-99 program 
activities and the other food production programs.
6TABLE 1.5
AREA HARVESTED, PRODUCTION AND YIELD PER HECTARE OF 
ROUGH RICE (PADDY), PHILIPPINES, CY 1967-68 TO CY 1975-76
Crop Year Area(Mil. Hectares)
Production 
(Mil. Cavans 
of 44 kgs)
Yield per Hectare
Cavans m. t.
1967-68 3.30 103.7 31.4 1.38
1968-69 3.33 101.0 30.3 1.33
1969-70 3.11 118.9 38.2 1.68
1970-71 3.11 121.4 39.0 1.72
1971-72 3.25 115.9 35.7 1.57
1972-73 3.11 100.3 32.2 1.32
1973-74 3.44 127.1 37.0 1.63
1974-75 3.54 128.6 36.4 1.60
1975-76 3.58 140.0 39.1 1.72
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Quezon City, 1975 
and 1976.
of reaching the limit in expanding land area. According to Encarnacion 
and others (1976) it is getting clearer that further expansion of land 
area cannot be counted on as a substantial source of future growth in 
food production. The second alternative is that of increasing production 
through more and better irrigation facilities, adoption of high yielding 
rice varieties (HYVS), improved credit, wider use of fertilizer and 
chemicals, improved marketing facilities and effective extension ser­
vices - all of which seem promising for attaining increased yields per 
unit area. In fact, irrigation and multiple cropping are considered 
the most important means of shifting from land-extensive to land­
intensive cultivation.
7In 1969 to 1973 the National Food and Agriculture Council 
(NFAC) implemented several food production programs which included 
rice, whitecorn, feedgrains, livestock, poultry, fruit, vegetables, 
and nutrition. Several crash programs have also been implemented to 
suit the needs of circumstances. For rice alone, two short programs 
were launched - "Operation Rice Bowl" in Central Luzon, and "Operation 
Palagad" in nine provirtbes in September 1972 and January 1973, 
respectively. The main objective of these was to recoup losses caused 
by successive calamities. For various reasons not much success was 
achieved and so the Philippine government launched the Masagana 99 
Rice Production Program in May 1973. This program aims to increase 
production to achieve rice self-sufficiency through a non-collateral 
supervised credit scheme coupled with transfer of technology (from 
experimentation to extension, mass media and coordinated government 
management). The Masagana 99 approach is, in effect, consistent with 
the previously mentioned second option of increasing rice production 
and requires concentrated efforts for effective implementation to occur 
A thorough discussion of the Masagana 99 program will be found in 
Chapter 4. Though it is still rather early, an evaluation of the M-99 
program can to some extent cast light on what has already been attained 
and the factors which have constrained the effective implementation of 
the scheme.
1 National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC) is an agency in charge 
of coordinating the different government and private agencies 
related to food and agriculture by virtue of Executive Order No. 183 
May 1969.
81.4 Objectives of the Study
The general objective of this study is to evaluate the impact 
of the Masagana 99 program and its contribution to agricultural production. 
Specifically, an attempt will be made to throw light on the following 
questions:
(1) To what Extent can share of increases in rice 
production be attributed to the program? and,
(2) What are the issues and the problems that affect 
the implementation of the M-99 program?
1.5 Organization of the Study
This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 gives a 
brief overview of agriculture and the staple food, rice. Chapter 2 pre­
sents a survey of agricultural credit programs in some developing 
countries. This leads us to a discussion of agricultural credit in the 
Philippines in Chapter 3, suggesting a supervised credit; scheme as a 
possible solution to small farmers' credit problems. The Masagana 99 
Rice Production Program is focused on in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents 
the coverage and achievements of the Masagana 99 program along with 
some of the problems associated with its implementation. Chapter 6 
summarizes the results in analyzing the impact of the Masagana 99 
program. Finally, the summary and conclusions arising from the study 
are presented in Chapter 7.
9CHAPTER 2
SURVEY OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT PROGRAMS
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and evaluate some 
agricultural credit programs which have operated in some countries 
other than the Philippines. The objectives, experiences, and the lessons 
of these programs will be considered in order to better understand and 
evaluate the agricultural credit program of the Philippines. Countries 
like Brazil, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka are chosen 
because they are developing countries and, like the Philippines, are 
dominated by the agricultural sector. More importantly, the agricul­
tural credit programs"*" in these countries have had significant results 
and have evolved into successful programs over the period of implementation.
Most, if not all, agricultural credit programs in LDCs are
intended to achieve multifarious goals such as the promotion of economic
development in a broad sense, but more particularly to increase agricul-
tural output and improve the income of farmers. In practice, however,
1 The credit programs covered in this chapter are shown below:
Abbreviation Name Country Date Started
ACAR Associacao de Credito Brazil 1948
Y Assistencia
BIMAS Mass Guidance Indonesia 1963
COMILLA Comilia Rural Bangladesh 1959
Development Projects
HYVP High Yielding India 1965
Varieties Program
NAGS New Agricultural Sri Lanka 1967
Credit Scheme
10
it is quite clear that the main objectives of all of the countries 
cited above are to increase agricultural output in order to attain 
self-sufficiency in food production and, at the same time, to improve 
the income of the rural population. For our purposes therefore, we 
will consider these particular objectives since these are more apparent 
than the general objectives.^"
2.1 The Objectives
As mentioned earlier, the main objectives of agricultural 
credit programs are usually (a) increased agricultural output to attain 
self-sufficiency in food production, and (b) improved income of the 
rural population. All of the countries cited above aimed to achieve 
the first objective. However, Sri Lanka and India differed in their 
second objective. Their governments specified that the second objective 
of their program was to relieve the farmers of their chronic indebted­
ness to non-bank sources of credit such as professional money lenders, 
traders, landlords, relatives, and friends.
The governments of most less developed countries, and developed 
countries, too, have programs for making loans available to small farmers. 
The rationale behind these programs often is that the interest rates 
charged by money lenders and other sources of non-bank credit are 
exploitive and a barrier to development (Long, M., 1968).
1 In 1971, Hayami and Ruttan had similarly included the above objectives 
in four "perspectives" with emphasis on credit as one instrument of 
agricultural development. Their four perspectives are (1) Shumpeterian 
development; (2) market reform; (3) adoption of modern inputs; and 
(4) income transfer. For a detailed explanation see Hayami and Ruttan, 
1971.
11
The first objective, that of increasing agricultural output, 
can be achieved by either expanding the area for cultivation, or by 
increasing productivity (for instance by technical improvements), or 
by a combination of both. For productivity and hence production to 
increase, appropriate technological improvements such as new HYVs, 
fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, new cultural practices, and so on 
must be introduced and *be adopted by the farmers concerned, particularly 
by the small and marginal farmers.
In all of the countries surveyed here, both expanding the 
area for cultivation and increasing productivity were the means for 
increased agricultural output. However, in Sri Lanka, relative emphasis 
was given to technological change. Between 1960 and 1968, an increase 
of 20.6 million bushels of paddy occurred, of which 56.3 per cent was 
attributed to the use of modern inputs (Gunatilleke, et al., 1972, 
p. 144). This does not mean however, that increases in output due to 
the expansion of area were not important, we must bear in mind here 
the idea of a "land frontier", at which the expansion of land area 
might reach its limit. This example suggests that, as a general princi­
ple, information about increases in production cannot be interpreted 
properly unless increases are specified as due to expanded area or 
improved techniques.
Increases in productivity, which appear to have accompanied 
the introduction of most credit programs mentioned above (except for 
ACAR program in Brazil), could not have been achieved if the credit 
programs had not provided the farming community with the capital 
required for increased input usage.
12
That the second objective of improved welfare through 
improved income distribution is often important is well illustrated 
by the ACAR program in Brazil. These was a substantial impact on the 
standard of living as found by Mosher in his 1957 evaluation and 
3-ater in 1971. However, Mosher concluded that although ACAR was out­
standing in terms of welfare impact, it had not yet exerted a measurable 
impact on agricultural ''production.
2.2 The Experiences
Continued attempts are being made by the governments of 
developing countries to increase agricultural production through a 
fuller use of existing resources and the provision of additional credit 
to support the use of modern inputs. At first, credit programs were 
usually i-piemented as pilot projects. Of course, success seemed 
likely judging by the experiences of ACAR, COMILLA and BIMAS programs. 
In these cases, however, success was due mainly to the availability of 
credit, modern inputs like new HYVs, fertilizers and pesticides, and 
supervision from technicians - all of which were amply provided. Since 
"success" seemed common, this inspired the governments of other 
countries committed to developing the agricultural sector to expand 
the areas under credit programs, sometimes to the national level. The 
immediate expansion in the coverage of the program often led to various 
problems in the provision of credit and in ensuring the availability of 
inputs and appropriate technical supervision for the farmers "to the 
right place at the right time".
A large range of literature on types of credit available to 
small farmers exists, most of which assumed that non-bank sources or
13
informal credit sources were exploitive and therefore undesirable.
These studies often advocated the formation of organized cooperative 
credit societies under government supervision but managed by farmers.
In Indonesia the BIMAS program ran into difficulties in pro­
viding credit because all agricultural loans (including BIMAS loans) 
were given out through the branches of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) 
(Rachman, 1973). Since its branches were limited in number it was 
difficult for the BRI to distribute BIMAS loans effectively to village 
farmers. In the first BIMAS program, agricultural cooperatives were 
established and BRI distributed loans through them. In 1968 they 
recognized that there was a need to establish rural banks called 
"village units" to provide loans at the village level. In Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, and India, where cooperative societies are well organized, 
loans under government agricultural credit schemes were channelled to 
farmers through cooperative societies of which the farmers were members. 
The cooperative societies obtained their loans from government banks 
and relent them to the farmers in accordance with the approved credit 
schemes.
This was not, however, the case for the ACAR in Brazil.
ACAR is a rural development program organized by the American Inter-
2national Association (AIA) for economic and social development. Funds
1 This program started in 1963 as a pilot project. In 1964-65 the pro­
gram became Mass Demonstration (Demonstrasi Massal), then became 
Mass Guidance (Bimbingan Massal) in 1965-66 and finally became BIMAS 
programs from 1966—68. Various names, such as BIMAS, Baru, BIMAS Ciba 
and BIMAS Gotong Rojong were used to explain the various BIMAS-type 
programs.
2 AIA is a non-profit cooperative which was founded in 1946 by
Mr Nelson A. Rochefeller. It plans, organizes and operates self-help 
programs in underdeveloped countries.
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were provided by contributions from both the AIA and the state govern­
ment of Minas Gerais in Brazil.
In all of the programs surveyed, credit was linked with 
extension programs and with cooperative societies and tied to farmers' 
production plans. In the COMILLA program in Bangladesh, no credit was 
made available unless the farmer became a member of a cooperative 
society and made regular deposits. The same was true in India. The 
farmer-borrower, to be able to avail himself of credit, was required 
to be a member of a cooperative and to contribute to the share capital 
of the society concerned. In the case of old or continuing members, 
one requirement was that the intending borrowers must not have defaults. 
These rules were applicable to all farmers, large and small. In reality, 
however, problems usually developed which reduced the amount of credit 
that a small farmer obtained. Where a farmer was not a cooperative 
member, he had to raise money to purchase a share and become a member.
The share to credit ratio in general, was 1:8 or 1:10. If the per acre 
credit requirement of a farmer was Re. 400 and if he operated 4 acres, 
his total credit need would be Re. 1600. Thus, to obtain a credit of 
Re. 1600, he had to raise Re. 160 with which to purchase shares of 
the society and to become a member. In short, the inability to purchase 
enough shares prevented a great flow of credit to small farmers. The 
All-India Rural Debt and Investment Survey (1961-62) concluded that per 
acre credit received by large farmers having assets of over 20,000 Rupees 
or holdings of over 25 acres was twice that received by farmers with 
holdings of 5 acres or so (Sen, B., 1973). Further, the Survey 
suggested that the factors contributing to a greater proportion of 
cooperative credit going to the larger farmers were that (1) cooperative
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leadership and management were in the hands of the larger farmers,
(2) land ownership was used as the sole basis for extending credit to 
the members, and (3) technical expertise, operational efficiency and 
coordination were lacking within and between agencies in charge of 
cooperative credit and agricultural input supplies. As a consequence, 
small farmers often turned to the money lenders who gave credit at 
exhorbitant interest rates.
In general, in most countries surveyed loans were extended 
to farmers provided they had security or collateral to offer. This 
could be in the form of land titles or, alternatively, farm machinery 
and other tangible assets. Normally, peasant farmers who could not 
offer acceptable collateral were not considered credit worthy. For 
example, in Sri Lanka loans given to the cooperative societies were 
based on bonds signed by the chairman and secretary of the society. 
However, assets such as land, buildings and vehicles were acceptable 
to cooperative societies as collateral. This is particularly true in 
the New Agricultural Credit Scheme (NAGS) of Sri Lanka. Similarly, 
the cooperative societies in Bangladesh asked for a mortgage deed in 
favour of the society with full ownership of the property mortgaged 
as collateral. Farmers' shares and savings served as additional 
securities in Bangladesh.
In a recent survey of experiences in a number of countries, 
Gordon (1976) mentioned that security arrangements for protecting 
lenders from loss are, of course, tactical elements. He explained 
that in some situations the requirement that one or more persons must, 
along with borrower, sign a document that involves them in repayment
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obligations may provide a very effective way of minimizing defaults.
In other cases, a more tangible form of security seems advisable: 
it is appreciated that collateral in land is not very appropriate for 
small farmer loans, and a portion of the borrower's crop ought to be 
more suitable as a form of collateral. If land is used as collateral 
the lending agency has the right to claim the land in case of a default. 
In contrast, if a trader assigns some portion of his goods as collateral, 
the bank can if necessary take hold of the goods and sell them, without 
trouble, to another merchant in the same business. Further, financial 
assets like notes or bonds are suitable as bank assets. But there is 
some question as to whether agricultural land is equally valuable to 
a bank. Typically, there is not an active market for agricultural 
land in developing countries, so banks may find themselves in possession 
of pieces of land that they cannot easily dispose of and may have to 
hold for some time. Thus, land may well be a poor asset for a bank, 
especially when the small parcels of land are located in remote areas 
without connecting roads.
Default is not only a major bottleneck to any credit program, 
but is essentially unjust. In effect, the government and the successful 
or honest farmers are subsidizing the minority of defaulters. In 
practice, there are various factors that contribute to non-repayment.
In some countries such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, it was the large 
farmers who created the principal default problem (Spring Review of 
Small Farmer Credit, 1973). The large farmers, because of their (often 
considerable) economic and political power, were frequently able to 
make arrangements to prevent being prosecuted for defaulting. Another 
factor was crop failure caused by natural calamities such as droughts,
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floods, typhoons, and sometimes pest infestation. In Bangladesh and 
India, natural calamities were usually mentioned as the cause of high 
default rates. Other reasons mentioned were low incomes, unwillingness 
to repay, and indifference to the credit program. In particular, some 
farmers were unwilling to repay both because they believed that the 
government writes off loans that were given to them, and because they 
considered themselves justified on the grounds that the government had 
usually promised much more than had ever been delivered. This was 
said to be true in Bangladesh and in Sri Lanka. In Indonesia, however, 
low recovery of debts was reportedly due to the negligence of village 
leaders in collecting the loans and the misuse of loans, often by local 
village leaders.’*'
Several recommendations for dealing with these problems have 
been put forward, and some have been implemented. In the sense that 
the government usually bears the brunt of default, the view has been 
clearly expressed by many observers that past loans should not be 
waived. Since agricultural credit resources are mostly dependent upon 
government allocation of funds which are limited in most developing 
countries, a substantial portion of loans provided should be recovered 
to enable continued provision of credit to farmers. If the government 
decided to waive the past loans, the funds would not revolve and the 
credit program would be more likely to fail in its objectives of 
increased production and improved welfare. In the case of credit pro­
vided by private sources, a low recovery may induce creditors to shift 
to more profitable alternative investments.
1 According to Fisk (1961) in developing countries, problems of this 
sort are not uncommon.
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In general, if loans are not repaid on time, farmers are 
not necessarily freed of the responsibility for repaying the loans. 
Instead the repayment would be expected in the following period.
Efforts can be made to collect debts by denying the farmer-borrowers 
the right to any further credit until their debts are paid. According 
to this view, default may be an index of the non-creditworthiness of 
a farmer. As such, a farmer should no longer be provided with credit 
until he has repaid the loan. During the period of delayed repayment 
interest charges augmented by penaLty rates or fines may be applied.
On the other hand, a personal approach could be undertaken in one of 
several ways, a friendly and sympathetic approach or alternatively an 
increasingly forceful manner could be tried (Gordon, 1976).
Experience in a number of countries suggests that a scheme 
of crop insurance properly implemented might reduce the incidence of 
default in bona fide cases. Ray (1967) observed that insurance gives 
farmers greater confidence in venturing upon the adoption of new and 
improved farming practices and in making greater investment in agri­
culture for improving crop yields and increasing agricultural production.
An agricultural crop insurance scheme has something to offer 
an institutional credit program. Even at times of crop failure it may 
enable the credit institution to recover its loans and be sufficiently 
liquid for further credit operations. The insurance itself could be 
offered as collateral for loans. It could also encourage better 
utilization of land and irrigation water. In the absence of the 
insurance, farmers who depend on irrigation water may postpone culti­
vation till water levels rise to unnecessarily high levels that waste 
water by evaporation and seepage. Where a scheme of agricultural
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insurance is present, fanners may be more easily persuaded to stagger 
their cultivation cycle and thus make better use of labour, farm 
machinery, and draft animals.
In 1958, a crop insurance scheme was introduced in Ceylon 
(now Sri Lanka). This experiment is of particular value in evaluating 
the practicability of crop insurance for peasant agriculture and in
Vi*
suggesting modifications necessary for effective implementation. Sri 
Lanka's experience has already highlighted the difficulties inherent in 
reconciling low premium rates within paying capacity of the peasant 
farmers, with an adequate level of coverage. It has not yet found a 
way to achieve such reconciliation without the risk of inadequate 
coverage because premiums based on averaging are inequitable. Thus, 
such programs place heavy subsidy burdens on the government if they 
are to be made more equitable. A guideline for the introduction of an 
agricultural insurance scheme based on Sri Lanka's experience has been 
published (Sanderatne, 1974).
Another way of reducing defaults or increasing repayments may 
be the introduction of group or corporate responsibility. One of the 
advantages of a joint system is that it relies on the group, rather 
than on the individual farmer, to meet the provisions of the loan and 
to make certain that it is repaid. The group decides who is credit­
worthy and what form of collateral is required. The internal cohesion 
and solidarity of the group then determines the degree of social 
pressure among members for proper implementation and repayment. If the 
credit society is newly formed, the availability of group loans and the 
need to develop group practices and responsibility for handling credit
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may itself gradually contribute to solidarity. Such group or corporate 
responsibility for credit operates well in Bangladesh, although the 
provisions for lending have been quite different. The credit coopera­
tives in COMILLA operate on a uniform system that allows any farmer who 
deposits some savings in his local cooperative society to borrow up to 
five times the amount of his combined share and savings deposits, with 
his plot of land as collateral. Group solidarity is reinforced by 
weekly meetings, and by the practice of extending more credit to those 
who attend more meetings. Also, the local group is held accountable 
for loan defaults; this is enforced by withholding funds from de­
faulting societies. In this way, the loan structure develops or 
reinforces group solidarity and responsibility (Myers, 1973).
In contrast, however, credit groups in India often had not 
been able to mobilize such group solidarity. In India, .the requirements 
for pledging land as collateral had favoured the wealtheir farmers and 
reinforced the unequal land tenure pattern. Little group cohesion had 
developed because the cooperatives were imposed by the government on a 
highly stratified and often factional village structure (Abraham, 1973).
It appears that for group sanctions to produce good results, 
they require not only solidarity within the group but also suitable 
attitudes on the part of group members and their leaders that support 
the purposes and operations of other credit projects which might be 
tried in future. Experience suggests that group sanctions will work 
better when members have some equity in a credit program and their 
own money is at risk along with outside loan funds. When members are 
required to deposit some savings as part of the working capital they
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feel the responsibility for the success of the entire group venture 
and tend to be more careful in the use of funds. We cannot, however, 
regard this group responsibility as a panacea for default and 
delinquency problems.
One generalization that could be inferred from the Spring 
Review country experiences is that credit and marketing functions 
should be tied together for the successful functioning of farmers' 
credit groups. When the association through which the credit is 
channelled also has control over marketing, the collection of repay­
ments becomes much easier. On the other hand, if secure marketing 
channels are not available, the whole purpose of small farmer credit 
may be defeated. In Bangladesh, small farmer groups with access to 
credit failed because they could not get access to market outlets 
(Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit, Analytical Papers, 1973).
Some experts have pointed to the idea of combining credit 
with input supplies as well as crop marketing schemes. This idea 
might be implemented through cooperative bulk purchasing and retail 
distribution systems. One great advantage seems to be to facilitate 
the granting of credit in kind rather than in cash, a practice which 
many experts have endorsed. The most permanently effective interaction 
of credit and market functions can be observed in multi-purpose coopera­
tives reportedly present in Israel, Yugoslavia, Mexico and Brazil 
(Gordon, 1976).
If the objective of credit policies is the transformation of 
traditional farming into modern agriculture, then the establishment of 
modern institutions adequately staffed to supervise the implementation
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of agricultural policies is essential. Credit becomes relevant in 
supporting the overall needs of institutions like multi-purpose 
cooperatives for research, development, processing, packing equipment, 
etc., and to finance the production expenses of individual farmer- 
members once the scheme is under way.
Capital and credit markets in developing countries are 
imperfect in varying degrees. As a result, interest rates often do not 
allocate resources among competing uses effectively. The rates of 
interest affect the demands for and the supplies of goods, assets and 
factors of production over time, and in this way influence the rate of 
growth of the economy, price stability and the distribution of income. 
Inappropriate interest rate policies distort capital markets and reduce 
their contribution to economic development.
Ideally, interest rates in agriculture should cover the costs 
of capital and the costs of associated services such as operational, 
administrative and supervisory costs as well as the losses because of 
defaults. Credit programs are costly and in a successful program the 
value of the benefits (which includes the increases in production 
attributable to the program, income from loan interest, and other 
social benefits) must exceed the costs (administrative, supervisory, 
default, alternative opportunity costs on the funds invested, and other 
social costs) (Long, 1974). In practice, however, this is often not 
realized, and as a consequence costs often exceed benefits. In other 
words, credit programs are often subsidized by the government because 
the costs are higher than the income derived from loan interest.
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In the countries surveyed, interest rates were usually 
well below market rates and real rates were sometimes negative, partly 
because of high inflation rates and partly because governments are 
often lenient creditors (Table 2.1).
TABLE 2.1
INTEREST RATES CHARGED BY AGRICULTURAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
(per cent per year)
Country Nominal Rates Real Rates*3 Rate of Inflation
Bangladesh 12 9 3
Brazil 15 -7 22
India 9 -1 10
Indonesia 12 6 6
Sri Lanka 12 6 6
a Nominal rates are averages of the reported rates charged on
various types of agricultural loans by one or more institutions 
in given countries. Generally, the rates in private banks are 
higher.
b Real rates were obtained by subtracting from nominal rates the 
average annual rate of increase in the consumer price index over 
1967-70, the period for which most nominal rates were reported.
The interest "subsidy" rate was important in the success of 
ACAR in Brazil. The interest rate charged on ACAR loans ranged from 
6 to 8 per cent per year in 1949 to 1963 and there was a legal ceiling 
on loans of 12 per cent per year. Since Brazil had a chronic inflation 
rate of about 15 to 25 per cent per year for the same period (reaching 
a peak of 120 per cent in 1964), these rates constituted a significant 
subsidy. Further, these very low nominal interest rates of 6 to 8 per
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cent charged on loans made it impossible for ACAR's loan portfolio to 
maintain its real value. One justification for this low interest rate 
is that farmers are close to subsistence levels of living, so the sub­
sidy encouraged them to increase their production throug the use of 
credit and new technology. Wharton, in 1969, pointed out that one 
interesting observation of ACAR was the exclusion of small farmers from 
the normal banking systfem, whose rates of 8 per cent per year were 
equally negative in real terms and whose loans were consequently mono­
polized by larger farmers. There was evidence that prior to the ACAR 
program, the larger farmers were securing their loan funds through 
organized formal money markets, while the small farmers were securing 
their credit from informal and unorganized sources at rates that were 
10 to 28 per cent higher. Wharton concluded that the provision of loans 
to ACAR farmers, therefore, had some merit in providing them with a 
"share of the pie" also at subsidy rates.
In LDGs the introduction of the new high-yielding rice varie­
ties necessitated increased application of inputs such as fertilizer, 
agro-chemicals, etc., and more sophisticated management practices - 
all of which required farmers to mobilize more working capital resources 
than they did previously. The farmers' capacity to increase their 
yields and benefits from advances in technology depended on the ready 
availability of credit. The new HYVs proved to be very responsive to 
fertilizer application, hence recommendations about increased applica­
tions along with other modern inputs become mandatory to encourage 
farmers to raise the yield per unit area. Most of the developing 
countries do not produce fertilizer and if they do, they produce only 
at minimal levels. Governments must usually augment supplies by
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importing fertilizers from abroad to meet requirements. Since 
fertilizer is an oil-based input, it entails high costs that farmers 
cannot easily afford. Governments have therefore often decided to sub­
sidize fertilizer to make it available to farmers. The problem with 
fertilizer is not only adequate supplies, but also distribution within 
the country. To increase yields, fertilizers should arrive when needed. 
In reality, however, these inputs are not always available on time.
This is not uncommon in the case of pesticides and other 
modern inputs as well. Suffice it to say that efforts should be 
directed to make these modern inputs physically available in sufficient 
amounts at the place and time needed by farmers.
2.3 Lessons for the Philippines
It would be tedious to relate the details of all of the credit 
programs surveyed. However, the results are interesting and worthwhile 
discussing briefly. The "successes and failures" depend on how the 
programs are evaluated and who does the evaluation. The AGAR, COMILLA, 
and BIMAS credit programs all started as pilot projects which were 
implemented in limited areas, and they succeeded as predicted. However, 
when the area under the program was expanded, various problems were 
generated, such as credit failures, the restricted availability of 
modern inputs, and the lack of technical supervision.
Some of the features that contributed to relative success and 
failure were discussed earlier, and others will be discussed below.
What is more important here is for us to understand how and why those 
problems occurred, what were the effects, and how the governments tried 
to curb or check the generated problems.
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The BIMAS program in Indonesia is reported to have succeeded 
in increasing output and to have made a great contribution to agricul­
tural development and the attitudes of farmers regarding use of inputs 
(Rachman, 1973) . The BRI realized that it could not carry out such a 
program on its own, and that it was necessary to coordinate rural credit 
institutions such as the village units.
The implementation of the BIMAS program in Indonesia was 
rendered difficult due to rigidity in the distribution of inputs to its 
peasant-borrowers. In this case, there was a definite bias against 
deferring to the judgement of the farmers in the amount and kind of 
inputs necessary for optimum growth. Thus the market mechanism, which 
would likely permit the farmers to choose the appropriate combination 
of inputs, was avoided in preference for the planning mechanism, which 
vested the power of choice in the hands of bureaucracy. In practice, 
the Government of Indonesia prescribed the kind and amount of fertilizer 
and pesticides, and distributed these inputs in the form of a "packet". 
Critics agreed that BIMAS during its operation between 1964 and 1968 
failed to spread the use of fertilizer and pesticides and problems of 
distribution and use were encountered (Hansen, 1973). In 1969, they 
highlighted the distribution of IR varieties, the "miracle" varieties 
developed by IRRI in the Philippines in 1966, which were found quite 
vulnerable to certain pests in Indonesia. In addition, the IR rice 
varieties were not liked by consumers because of their poor eating 
quality and hence, the price was lower than the non-IR rice. As an 
answer to this, the Indonesian government promoted research into develop­
ment of high yielding rice varieties more adopted to consumer tastes 
and the production conditions of the country.
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A different example was the CIBA -BIMAS contract with 
Indonesia for aerial spraying and other inputs. At that time, the 
BIMAS program was encountering various problems in a HYV rice program 
it was sponsoring. Farmers did not see the reason for using pesticides 
and .if they did, they did not see how they could maintain sprayers. 
There was faulty delivery of inputs which led to an accumulation of 
problems. Although the aerial spraying program was well intentioned - 
the plan was to solve the pest problem in one stroke - there was strong 
resistance to the CIBA-BIMAS program on the part of farmers so the 
aerial spraying contract was terminated in 1970 after a two-year trial.
The result of the aerial spraying program is remarkable in 
that it reveals major policy changes in midstream as a result of feed­
back from the program. It. stands out as a case of sequential learning 
and action. In the end, the BIMAS program is an excellent paradigm 
of the impact that political factors can have. It is striking to 
note that the program involved the peasant population so widely that 
widespread dissatisfaction provoked a response from the Government of 
Indonesia.
The AGAR program in Brazil had been acclaimed as the most 
outstanding agricultural credit scheme in Latin America. As mentioned 
earlier, it had exerted a welfare impact on the levels of living, but 
this was partly due to the very low real interest rates charged to 
farmers. However, a very substantial income transfer was accomplished
1 CIBA is a Switzerland pesticide company. Other foreign companies 
which undertook similar projects were Hoechst from West Germany, 
Coopa from Italy and Mitsubishi from Japan.
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through the credit markets. There were other critical issues about 
the ACAR program such as program costs and the program impact. Until 
1963-64 ACAR was getting a grant from abroad to the amount of $US80,000 
per year (Penny, 1968) to cover administrative costs and was able to 
get much of its capital funds from overseas at 2 per cent interest.
Also, in 1968 apparently only 5 per cent of farmers in the state of 
Minas Gerais received dtedit from ACAR (Ribeiro and Wharton, 1966). 
However, major accomplishments are equally important to mention. These 
were (1) the ACAR introduced ingredients of experimentation, adoption 
and flexibility into Brazil's agricultural development thinking, (2) the 
program acquired a notable administrative and financial continuity with 
insulation from the political process, (3) ACAR trained a large number 
of Brazilian technicians, and (4) ACAR's experience was used to evolve 
a nationwide program of extension and credit. Furthermore, although 
ACAR operated with federal and state government funds, it was viewed 
as a private entity and experienced little political interference.
This led to growing confidence in the organization among officials and 
particularly among farmers. Some of the changes that evolved were due 
to the lessons learned along the way and the willingness of the organi­
zation to make such changes. This capacity for change in response to 
the lessons learned and to changing needs may well be the most signifi­
cant feature of successful institutionalized programs of change - 
change agencies must be willing and able to make themselves.
In Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, quite similar features 
occurred in relation to their cooperative credit societies. The pro­
vision of technical and input resources was often insufficient and was 
not always on time; credit provided was on the basis of guarantors
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and, sometimes, on pledgeable assets; and small farmers were asked 
first to form and join cooperative societies before they were entitled 
to receive credit facilities. It was difficult for some small farmers 
to purchase shares in the societies to become members. This prevented 
a great flow of credit to small farmers and it seems that the credit 
programs are not yet successful in reaching many of the small farmers 
and tenants.
As often mentioned, defects in the system of loan recovery 
have also been attributed to the system of cooperatives. Very often 
too, the leaders of cooperatives were incompetent and were appointed 
mainly for political reasons. The result, of course, was that there 
were deficiencies, mismanagement, incapability to recover or collect 
loans and a low repayment and high default rates.
In Bangladesh, a particular problem was that a small unit of 
local government called a "thana" could not become easily viable, 
especially in the handling of credit operations such as those in the 
COMILLA projects. In 1967-68, the Thana Irrigation Program was opened 
up and made possible better winter cultivation for new crops. Fertilizer, 
better seeds, pest control, training and extension services with irri­
gation increased production possibilities. Together, these increased 
the demand for credit. However, COMILLA played a major role in the 
"compulsion" of irrigation agriculture. Many of COMILLA projects' 
cooperative associations were organized around the acquisition and 
operation of tubewells or hydraulic irrigation pumps. Each pump or 
well supported 30-50 family farms. The availability of the well at the 
time of COMILLA and the subsidization of the acquisition costs by the
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Government of Bangladesh was a powerful organizing incentive for 
families with compact farms. In short, the technology of the inputs 
mobilized social and political forces conducive to participation and 
forced a form of organization and self-government. Although this some­
times resulted in unequal distribution of water due to political prob­
lems of water management, the COMILLA had shown that irrigation pro­
vided a setting in whidh such group formation is more likely to be 
achieved. The efforts of the Bangladesh government to duplicate this 
successful project throughout the country fell short in cases where 
pump or tubewell irrigation was wanting and was not a part of the credit 
program. It is therefore possible that in Bangladesh no substitute 
can be found for the compulsory role that was played by the irrigation 
technology in the formation of COMILLA projects.
There were other interesting features of credit programs, but 
for our purposes the factors mentioned above provide a sufficient back­
ground to study and understand the credit program in the Philippines, 
particularly the Masagana 99 Supervised Credit Program.
Following this survey of credit programs, questions arise as 
to why, despite the many "deficiencies" or "failures”, credit programs 
are still being advocated and pursued vigorously in less developed 
countries. Penny (1968) listed four reasons, namely (1) the govern­
ments, and apparently many economists, are unaware of the attitudes of 
farmers to debt and credit, and that farmers are not willing to use 
credit at the earlier stage of development, (2) the governments see
1 For example, the bigger farmers obtained more water per farm than 
the smaller ones.
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programs as an easy way to increase the flow of capital: 
however, real capital is not created merely by increasing the supply 
of money, nor can capital be used for development purposes if farmers 
are permitted to use their borrowings for consumption, (3) governments 
in many low-income countries seem to feel that modern financial institu­
tions to serve farmers can be created at a stroke of a pen, but it is 
not realized that the growth of such institutions is as much a result 
as a cause of development, and (4) the governments fail to realize that 
there are some powerful reasons for the high nominal rates of interest 
charged in the so-called unorganized money-markets. Loanable funds are 
in short supply in low-income countries, and at first glance, it is 
not surprising to find that interest rates are higher than they are in 
high-income countries.
Based on the above review, it seems that the governments of 
the countries surveyed have strong beliefs that agricultural credit 
programs can effectively improve the welfare of the majority of the 
people -
'On the whole, the review suggests that problems arising from 
the implementation of agricultural credit programs were complicated in 
nature, i.e. political, economic and institutional. In Chapters 3 and 
5 of this paper, the problems that affected the previous agricultural 
credit programs and the M-99 program will be discussed. We will see 
later that Philippine credit problems were similar to the problems 
discussed here, but did not necessarily reflect actual local experiences. 
Hence, the solutions/actions undertaken cannot just be copied from the
countries surveyed.
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CHAPTER 3
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN THE PHILIPPINES
3.1 Capital as an Accelerator of Agricultural Development
Like most developing countries, the Philippine economy is 
basically agricultural and a large proportion of the total populace 
derives its livelihood from agriculture. Increased output and improved 
welfare therefore depend largely upon how effectively agricultural 
development can be carried out. Lack of capital is considered to be 
one of the bottlenecks to the successful development of agriculture 
and the economy as a whole. The availability of capital will help 
harness human and natural resources so as to overcome basic food short­
ages, continuously increase production and provide a sound foundation 
for industrial growth.
It is said that agricultural development, or any development 
effort for that matter, cannot be carried on, expanded or even sustained 
without adequate funds for the maintenance, replacement and improvement 
of capital goods and for meeting the operating costs of agricultural 
production (Tablante, 1965). The farmer needs capital both to purchase 
various production inputs and to meet his consumption needs. In detail, 
he needs capital to finance his current farm expenses, to purchase 
draft animals and implements, to undertake farm improvements, sometimes 
to acquire land, and even to finance family living expenses including 
various forms of social and ceremonial expenditures. Further, he needs 
capital to promote the fuller utilization and increased efficiency of 
labour, to improve technology in agricultural production and other
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operations like processing and marketing, and to maintain basic con­
sumption levels.
In the process of agricultural development large amounts of 
capital are required. Most of the farmers in the Philippines, however, 
do not have enough capital of their own due to many inter—related 
factors such as the small size of farms, unfair tenancy practices, 
idle farm labour, primitive methods of production, limited land use, 
and one-crop systems of farming. To agument their capital resources, 
by force of circumstances, farmers will have to borrow from others. 
Whether borrowed from credit institutions or from conventional/informal 
sources such as private money lenders, agricultural credit plays a 
significant role in agricultural development.
With the introduction of modern technology and the accom­
panying package of purchased inputs, credit assumes a very important 
role. However, Mosher has pointed out that agricultural credit cannot 
be seen as the prime mover, but rather as a complementary input in 
"getting agriculture moving". He mentioned five "essentials" for agri­
cultural development, namely (1) markets for farm products, (2) con­
stantly changing technology, (3) local availability of inputs, (4) 
adequate incentives for farmers, and (5) transport. Similarly, he 
listed five "accelerators" of agricultural development. These are 
education for development, production credit, group action by farmers, 
improving and expanding agricultural land, and national planning for 
agricultural development. Each of the latter is important but not 
indispensable, unlike the "essentials" (Mosher, 1969).
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3.2 Agricultural Credit in Retrospect (1903-1963)
For more than seven decades, governments of the Philippines 
have made repeated attempts to promote the development and expansion 
of rural credit facilities (Appendix A). These efforts have taken 
various forms and have been subjected to numerous changes to conform to 
prevailing conditions. While these measures have not all been success­
ful in achieving their stated objectives, especially in terms of im­
proving the productive and earning capacity of the small farmers, the 
cumulative history of their successes and failures offers a useful 
study of mistakes that must be avoided. It also serves as a guide in 
the formulation of new programs pertaining to agricultural credit in 
the Philippines.
Not much is known with respect to the amount of agricultural 
credit available for financing production inputs and farm development. 
However, it is generally believed that the amount has not been adequate 
and that the dearth of credit on reasonable terms has limited the 
growth in agricultural production. Institutional sources have probably 
provided around one-third of the total credit for agriculture, but for 
almost ten years there had been no real growth in the amount granted 
(World Bank Report, 1976). To this alarming trend one exception has 
been the supervised credit programs for rice and corn introduced in 
1973 and 1974 respectively.
3.3 Sources of Agricultural credit
In principle, the purchase of inputs can be financed by a 
combination of internal financing (personal savings of farmers) and
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external financing (both from institutional credit sources and from 
informal loans provided by relatives, friends, landlords and other 
individuals). Until recently, the latter remained an important source 
of credit for farmers, particularly the small and marginal ones. For 
this reason, the following discussion will deal with the lending 
institutions for agriculture. This is not meant to imply, however, 
that the informal sourdfes of credit are not important. Non-institutional 
sources of credit will also be discussed briefly in this chapter.
3.4 Access to Institutional Credit
One of the critical issues in credit policy is the extent to 
which the supply of institutional credit for agriculture can be expanded. 
It is striking to note that the share of credit going to agriculture 
in the Philippines declined steadily from 40 per cent in the early 
1950s to 18 per cent in the early 1960s and 7 per cent in 1973 (World 
Bank Country Economic Report, 1976, p. 359). Part of the reason is 
that there has been little attempt to expand the network of financial 
institutions serving the rural areas. This has become a constraint 
to increased lending. Moreover, the institutions' requirement of 
collateral for their loans has excluded a large number of small farmers.
The Philippine government is aware of this problem and in 
recent years has been vigorously promoting the rural banking system.
In the same vein, the Central Bank has already directed that at least 
25 per cent of all loanable funds from commercial banks should be for 
agricultural credit; not less than 10 per cent for agrarian reform; 
and the other 15 per cent for agricultural credit in general.
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3.5 Agricultural Lending Institutions
In line with the national programs designed to attain food 
self-sufficiency (particularly in rice), the Philippine government has 
allocated resources for agricultural credit through different lending 
institutions both private and public, in attempting to meet the needs 
of small farmers.
The total loans outstanding for agricultural production by 
lending institutions are summarized for the period 1965 to 1974 
(Table 3.1). These was a drop in total loans granted in 1971 due to
TABLE 3.1
LOANS OUTSTANDING FOR AGRICULTURE BY INSTITUTION 
(in million pesos)
Year AGLF ACA RBs PNB DBs CBs Total
Deflated
Total
1967 Prices
1965 87 167 569 293 458 1574 1760
1966 - 88 199 630 317 448 1682 1777
1967 n.a. 96 259 752 380 450 1936 1933
1968 15 106 302 857 438 612 2330 2208
1969 16 106 325 923 485 687 2542 2273
1970 17 119 391 973 500 741 . 2741 2139
1971 24 127 261 902 498 877 2689 1835
1972 65 127 508 855 740 919 3214 2010
1973 58 109 825 1283 820 961 4056 2225
1974 80 110 1334 14293 877 1278a 5108 2098
- zero or negligible
n.a. - not available
a - as of June 30, 1974
AGLF - Agricultural Guarantee and Loan Fund
ACA - Agricultural Credit Administration
RBs - Rural Banks
PNB - Philippine National Bank
DBs - Development Banks
CBs - Commercial Banks
Source: Institutional Credit Reports, Central
1974. (Adapted from World Bank Country Economic Report, 1976.
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credit restraints being tightened and priorities being changed. The 
Philippine National Bank, Development Bank of the Philippines and rural 
banks withdrew somewhat from the credit market, placing a greater 
reliance on commercial banks. It can be seen, however, that from 1971 
onwards there was an increasing volume of total loans granted to the 
agricultural sector in absolute terms. The Philippine National Bank 
and Commercial Banks comprised the first and second largest share of 
the total, about 30 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively. In real 
terms there was not a distinct trend from 1968 but an increase in real 
growth is expected to be achieved from 1973 due to recent credit 
policies.
3.5.1 Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
The Development Bank of the Philippines, established in 1958, 
is now one of the major government-owned financing institutions in the 
Philippines. The previous emphasis on rehabilitation and reconstruction 
in its early stages of operation has been shifted to development programs. 
The DBP has been the major source of medium and long-term finance for 
off-farm marketing and processing facilities and was expanded materially 
in the 1960s to finance the Filipinization of the rice-milling industry 
(Hears, 1974).
Because small farmers lack bankable securities they are pre- 
from using the loaning facilities of the bank and therefore 
"DBP is in no way a small farmers' bank" as Sacay has put it (Sacay, 1973). 1
1 More complete details of the present rice and corn financing schemes 
operated by the main institutions discussed below are given in 
Appendices B to E.
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3.5.2 The Philippine National Bank (PNB)
With a total of 162 branches and agencies, PNB grants short 
and long-term loans to agriculture and industry. Agricultural credit 
programs organized by the PNB include loans for production of various 
crops such as rice, corn, sorghum, etc.; as well as fisheries and 
forestry. As of June 30, 1974, the PNB1s financing of agricultural 
crops, fisheries and forestry totalled ^1629 million (Soliven, 1974).
Except for paddy and maize, all agricultural loans are based 
on the traditional lending scheme of the bank which calls for collateral. 
In 1973, the PNB went full scale into the Government's Masagana 99 
Rice Program and later into the Masaganang Maisan (corn program) aimed 
at food self-sufficiency and adopted a supervised credit scheme 
patterned after the Central Bank-Rural Banks system.
The PNB provided loans to 508,000 rice farmers and 99,000 
corn farmers during the period May 1973 to July 1974 (PNB Progress 
Report, 1974). This implies that PNB had begun to be a small farmers' 
bank.
3.5.3 Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA)
There are presently 49 branches and agencies of ACA throughout
the country.1 The ACA is the credit arm of the government for the
2 .Agrarian Reform Program. Funds are continuously provided by direct 1 2
1 Previously known as the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing 
Administration (ACCFA).
2 With the proclamation of the entire country as a land reform area 
(Presidential Decree No. 2, September 1972) the Department of Agrarian 
Reform implements the Agrarian Reform Program designed to "transfer 
ownership of the land to the tillers of the soil".
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aPPropriations from the government. The ACA extends production loans 
to small farmers on a non-collateral basis. By reason of its long 
experience in extending production loans to small farmers, it was 
designated by the National Food and Agriculture Council in 1973 as one 
of the institutions to service the credit needs of the Masagana 99 
program.
Although ACA loaned out about J?50 million to 50,600 rice and 
corn borrowers between May 1973 and July 1974, this was still small 
compared with other government institutions. This is probably due to 
the fact that ACA deos not enjoy rediscounting privileges with the 
Central Bank which serves as the clearing house for all the activities 
of different financial intermediaries.
3.5.4 Rural Banks (RBs)
The rural banking system supplies the main bulk of credit to 
small farmers. Although privately-owned, rural banks draw heavy 
financial support from the Central Bank in addition to assistance they 
receive in the training of their officers and employees. The redis­
counting window of the Central Bank is open to rural banks at preferred 
rates of interest. The system has expanded throughout the country from 
merely 18 rural banks in 1953 to 679 units in 1975.
In 1973, more than 90 per cent of the loans extended by these 
banks were channelled to agriculture averaging ^1218 per loan. Of this, 
more than 95 per cent were short-term loans for production (21st Annual 
Report, Rural Banks System, 1973).
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3.5.5 Commercial Banks (CBs)
Private commercial banks, with 440 branches and agencies at 
the end of 1970, are the largest institutional suppliers of credit 
averaging a total of approximately £*50 million a year. The banks pro­
vide financial assistance to ventures on large scale rice and corn 
farms and loans are generally limited to post-harvest activities and 
relatively stable agro-industrial enterprises (Hears, 1974, p. 273).
But loans to agriculture only make up a part of the minor part of their 
operations, representing only about 6 per cent of the total credit 
granted by them (Geonzon, 1972, p. 16).
3.6 NOn-Institutional Sources of Credit
While various formal credit institutions have made signifi­
cant contributions towards meeting the long-term, medium-term and short­
term credit needs of farmers, they are still inadequate to cope with 
the capital requirements of a large segment of the farming population. 
This is particularly true with respect to short-term credit. A con­
siderable amount of the short-term credit available - more than half of 
the production credit and about 95 per cent of the non-production credit 
(World Bank Country Economic Report, 1976) has come from traditional 
sources.
A study conducted in 1957 by the College of Agriculture in 
Laguna, showed that of 2411 short-term production loans, 88 per cent 
came from private individuals (42 per cent), landlords (39 per cent), 
friends and relatives of borrowers (6 per cent) and merchants (1 per 
cent). These lenders charged interest rates ranging from about
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20 to 300 per cent per year, or an average of 55 per cent (Von Oppenfeld, 
1957, p. 20).
The unregistered private money lenders, landlords and other 
individuals continue to supply the bulk of agricultural credit in the 
Philippines because the modern credit institutions are rather remote 
from the type of socio-economic organizations existing in the rural 
areas "where relationships are more personal and traditional rather 
than business-like, where written records are rarely kept, where trans­
actions are generally sealed by oral promise based on trust and honour 
rather than by the sophisticated or elaborate legal documentation and 
where the hard shell of custom and attitudes makes farmers resistent 
to change, new ideas, new techniques and new institions". Tablante 
(1965) further observed that despite the "abuses" and "malpractices" 
associated with loans obtained from private money lenders, this source 
of credit performs a service which cannot be provided by registered 
credit institutions.
The impact of institutional and non-institutional credit in 
the rural areas may best be exemplified by the average interest rates 
farmers paid. A study in 1957/58 in Nueva Ecija showed that the 
interest paid by the farming households averaged 52 per cent per year. 
Only 9 per cent of loans were obtained from institutional sources, the 
rest were served by landlords, private individuals, merchants and 
relatives. In 1969/70 another study in the same area showed that the 
average interest paid by farmers had declined to 22 per cent. About 
27 per cent of households obtained credit from institutional sources.
The interest charged by unregistered sources had also substantially
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decreased indicating that the expanded availability of institutional 
credit had reduced the profits which these unregistered sources used 
to enjoy (Table 3.2).
Results from BAE Indebtedness Survey in 1971-72 showed that
the proportion of loans to fanners from informal sources was reported
to be more than 70 per cent (Appendix F). Although landlords havem
declined in importance as a credit source due to the land reform pro­
gram, private money lenders remain major creditors. However, several 
studies such as the Philippine Statistics Survey of Households in 1960/61 
and BAE Integrated Agricultural Surveys 1971/72 have indicated that 
the trend over a ten-year period shows an increasing share of the total 
value of loans coming from institutional sources. From 1960/61 to 
1971/72, institutional credit increased from 38 per cent to 46 per cent 
respectively of total loans in cash and in kind (Table 3.3).
Despite the expansion of institutional credit, the credit 
needs of' the farmers in most developing countries are still being met 
through non-institutional sources because of the problems associated 
with institutional credit such as low agricultural loans, high adminis­
trative and maintenance costs, complicated loan procedures, collateral 
requirements and other "red tape" in loan seeking. Credit coming from 
these private sources has relatively high interest rates not only 
because of limited supplies of institutional credit but also because 
of the costs mentioned above in providing credit. This is supported 
by Long's conclusion that interest rates on agricultural loans are 
often high - primarily because capital is scarce, farm loans are costly 
to administer, the uncertainties of agriculture result in considerable 
loss through default, and the demand for credit is seasonal (Long, 1968).
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TABLE 3.2
SHORT-TERM LOANS AND AVERAGE INTEREST RATE PER YEAR 
BY SOURCE OF LOAN2 3 *
1957/58 1969/70
Source of Loan Number of
Loans
Average 
Interest/ 
Ye ark
Number of
Loans
Average 
Interest Rate/ 
Year
Informal Source
Landlord 125 69.2 261 26.2
Other Landlords 35 119.7 - -
Private Individual
Money Lenders 4 U / J* O o<± J U • u
Friends/Relatives 18 89.6 228 25.4
Merchants 6 81.5 17 15.0
Others — — 13 28.3
Sub-Total 204 87.ld 583 25.9
Formal/Institutional
ACA/FACOMA 9 18.3 100 11.3
Rural Banks 10 14.06 75 11.2
Other Banks 1 45 10.2
Sub-Total 20 16. ld 220 11.0
GRAND TOTAL 224 52.0 803 21.8
a Only fully repaid laons included.
b Computed according to Gapud1s formula:
Actual Amount Charged for Interest 1 -*-2 x -i nn Interest
Actual Amount Released Loan Paid Rate/Year
c Landlords other than the tenants.
d Not available, hence, computed by taking the average of the average
Source: (1) Jose P. Gapud, "Financing Lowland Rice Fanning in
Selected Barrios of Nueva Ecija,Crop Year 1957-58", 
Undergraduate Thesis, UPCA, Laguna, September 1959, p. 79
(2) Institute of Philippine Culture — Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, "Socio-Economic Study of Nueva Ecija Rice
Farms, Crop Year 1969-70".
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TABLE 3.3
SOURCES OF FARM CREDIT:
PER CENT OF TOTAL VALUE OF LOANS3
Survey and Year Institutional Informal Total
1. PSSH All Farms, 1960/61 38.0 62.0 100.0
2. FACOMA Members, Luzon 
Rice Farmers, 1965/66 57.0 43.9 100.0
3. BAE Integrated
Agricultural Survey 
Rice Farms, 1967/68 33.6 66.4 100.0
1968/69 42.1 57.9 100.0
4. BAE Integrated
Agricultural Survey
All Farms, 1970/71 53.0 47.0 100.0
1971/72 45.8 54.2 100.0
a Total loans in cash and in kind, 
b Includes some reports of no source.
Sources: (1) Philippine Statistics Survey of Households, May 1961.
(2) Rodolfo Matienzo, "A Study of Membership of Fourteen 
Active Rice Farmers Cooperative Marketing Associations, 
FACOMA in Central Luzon, Philippines", unpublished 
Masters Thesis, Oregon State University, June 1969,
p. 46.
(3) Bureau of Agricultural Economics Integrated 
Agricultural Surveys 1967/68, 1968/69, 1970/71 and 
1971/72.
(Adapted from Gelia T. Castillo's All in a Grain of Rice, 
SEARCA, 1975).
Interest charges for institutional credit for rice production 
in the Philippines ranged from 7-14 per cent per annum (Mears, 1974). 
These rates are significantly lower than those charged by traditional
sources. Some loans from all categories of the latter sources were found
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with effective rates exceeding 200 per cent. Most of these farm loans 
were small and without security, involving natural risks and adminis­
trative costs which called for higher interest rates unless loans had 
been subsidized.
The rural banks have been subsidized at two levels by the 
Central Bank of the Philippines. Firstly, they are provided with a 
preferential rate on their rediscounting of loan paper. If these 
financial subsidies were withdrawn, the effect undoubtedly would be to 
raise the cost of operations of rural banks. It was found by an Inter- 
Agency Committee on interest rates in 1971 that the effective rates of 
interest exceed nominal rates by the additional service fees and charges 
collected. In this regard, it was proposed that the maximum interest 
rate ceiling should take these hidden charges into account, so that 
nominal rates will be the same as effective rates. This involved 
setting ceilings higher than those proposed. To this effect, the 
Inter-Agency Committee recommended that the government should establish 
minimum nominal rates of 17-18 per cent per annum on bank lending.
A higher real interest rate will tend to remove the present bias in 
the Philippine economy toward capital-intensive techniques. Since 
medium-scale and small-scale enterprises tend to be more labour-intensive, 
giving them access to the institutional credit system will expand both 
output and employment opportunities in the economy. Hence, the goals 
set forth by the government will be achieved.
3.7 Supervised Credit Scheme - "A Possible Solution"
One of the ways to help solve the problems of agricultural 
productivity and low incomes of rural families in many countries is
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through the provision of "supervised credit". Supervised credit refers 
to a system of lending which combines production with technical services 
to the farmer-borrower to make sure that the loan is being used to adopt 
recommended practices to increase yields. An agent or technician helps 
the farmer-borrower to prepare a production plan and budget, credit is 
provided to the farmer, either in cash or in kind, or both. Regular 
visits are made by the'credit agents to help the farmers use the supplies 
and equipment financed by the loan. Such programs must meet particu­
lar requirements if they are to be effective in increasing rice production. 
If credit is to be effective in encouraging higher production, it must be 
extended to farmers at the right time and in the appropriate amount to 
purchase the optimum levels of inputs.
The experiences of the United States and a few Latin American 
countries in the practical application of supervised farming credit 
should prove valuable to the Philippines and other developing countries. 
However, it is not a wise policy to copy directly ideas and information 
from one country to another as differences in cultural, social, 
political, and economic conditions prevail. Recognizing the differences, 
it was decided in the early sixties to first test the workability of 
supervised credit in Philippine conditions through pilot projects.
The first pilot project was undertaken by the Development 
Bank of the Philippines in collaboration with the Agricultural Credit 
and Cooperative Institute of the University of the Philippines in 
Cabanatuan City in 1961. A second scheme was tried in Legaspi City 
in 1963. Preliminary results were encouraging so the projects were 
expanded with the suppjort of 23 agricultural field supervisors
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(Tablante, 1964, p. 568). The Department of Rural Banks and a few 
rural banks followed by initiating supervised credit programs in some 
areas.
In 1966, the Development Bank of the Philippines and the 
rural banking system in the country launched the Supervised Credit 
Scheme with the establishment of the Agricultural Guarantee and Loan 
Fund to integrate the provision of credit with intensive supervision 
by trained credit technicians. Despite the availability of funds and 
the guarantee feature, initial results were not entirely satisfactory 
due to the unwillingness or hesitance of rural bankers to participate 
actively in the program. This was apparently due to the unreliability 
of government technicians assigned to supervise loans from rural banks. 
Hesitance in granting high-risk loans may also be expected of these 
privately-owned rural banks.
After five years of AGLF implementation, expansion diffi­
culties were encountered. It accounted for hardly 3 per cent of the 
total volume of agricultural loans granted (Sacay, 1973, p. 6) . By 
the end of 1971, the AGLF was replaced by the Agricultural Guarantee 
Fund (AGF) program which had the objective of encouraging rural bankers 
to expand loan volumes and hire their own technicians. This new 
program made funds available to rural banks in the form of special 
time deposits (STDs) for three years bearing an interest rate of 
3 per cent instead of the usual 6 per cent per year. A rebate of 
one-half of this 3 per cent payment was given to rural banks who hired
their own technicians.
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A unique feature of the rural banks' supervised credit 
program as it now exists is the granting of loans to liability groups. 
Loans are granted without collateral to groups of farmers who agree to 
guarantee each others' loans.
In 1972, the Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF) was established to 
finance an accelerated rice production program in response to the 
severe floods that affected Central Luzon in that year. The ALF took 
over the functions of AGLF, administered by the Central Bank.
All these agricultural guarantee funds are administered by 
the Land Bank of the Philippines. The same bank also administers the 
funds provided under the Masagana 99 (M-99) and Masaganang Maisan 
programs. The M-99 program commenced in May 1973 to aid further recovery 
from damage to the rice crop which occurred in 1972-73. At the start 
of the M-99 program the government took measures to strengthen the agri­
cultural credit system. Firstly, the AGF raised its guarantee on losses 
from 70 to 85 per cent. Secondly, additional funds were channelled to 
the ALF as special time deposits in rural banks and thirdly, the redis­
counting system was overhauled. Fourthly, regional departments were 
established within the Central Bank which administered the Agricultural 
Loan Fund to expedite rediscounting. Although the AGF guarantee over­
lapped with that of the Agricultural Guarantee and Loan Fund, it pro­
vided a more liberal guarantee scheme (World Bank Report, 1976).
The implementation of the supervised credit program in rural 
bank operations has helped in easing one of the problems faced by small 
farmers: lack of credit assistance (Pacquing, 1969).
49
A study of the effect of supervised credit on selected 
farmer-borrowers in Nueva Ecija indicated that supervised credit has 
a positive effect on land, labour, resource use, farm output, and 
crop yield (Gapud, 1969). Hence, the possibility of increasing farm 
production and farm income through such schemes in the Philippines 
appears to be substantial. The M-99 program has become the most 
important supervised credit scheme operating in the Philippines and 
so it is through this program that, hopefully, the substantial potential 
for increased production and farm income that clearly exists will be 
realized.
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CHAPTER 4
MASAGANA 99 RICE PRODUCTION PROGRAM
During the years 1971-73, the Philippine rice harvests were 
severely affected by disasters including flooding of the main crops in 
the major rice area of Central Luzon in 1972 and drought in some parts 
of Visayas and Mindanao. To recoup the losses in rice production, the 
Philippine Government launched the Masagana 99 Rice Production Program 
on May 21, 1973. Masagana 99 (M-99) is the most massive and intensive 
rice production program ever attempted and implemented by the Govern­
ment in the Philippines' history.
4.1 Objectives of the Masagana 99 Rice Production Program
Three specific objectives of the program were set out:
first, to boost rice production by encouraging farmers in the target
provinces to adopt a modern package of technology; second, to improve
agricultural extension programs in the target provinces with support
from extension workers, local leaders and farmers.; third, to establish
applied research projects on rainfed rice culture land that would serve
2both as demonstration plots and as a basis for recommended practices.
These objectives were to be facilitated by the provision of 
credit (for the purchase of inputs such as fertilizers and agricultural 
chemicals) through rural banks and other credit institutions.
1 "Masagana" means "bountiful" and 99 is the target of 99 cavans 
(about 4.4 tons) of paddy per hectare on 1.76 tons per acre.
2 Masagana 99 Rice Production Program: Implementing Guidelines 
NFAC, Quezon City, 1973-74.
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The Masagana 99 Rice Program utilized a package of technology 
evolved from applied research conducted in five municipalities of 
Bulacan and Nueva Ecija provinces in 1971 by the International Rice 
Research Institute (IRRI) in cooperation with the Bureau of Agricultural 
Extension (BAEx) and the National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC). 
The same package was tried in 1972 in the irrigated and rainfed areas 
supported by the supervised credit scheme described in Chapter 3. The 
results were very promising with an average production of 90 cavans per 
hectare (1.6 tons per acre) being achieved. In addition to this, the 
program utilized the experiences of the BAEx-NFAC Special Projects and 
of "Operation Palagad 1973" in the Central Luzon provinces. These 
programs also suggested that by adopting the recommended package of 
technology coupled with supervised credit, rice production could be 
increased tremendously.
2Out of the 66 provinces around the country, 43 were selected 
for inclusion in the first phase of the M-99 program, i.e. from May to 
October, 1973 (Appendix G).
After the implementation of the first year of the program, an
additional 12 provinces and 2 cities were included. The inclusion of
39 associate provinces is still under consideration (Appendix G). A map 
showing the different target provinces is shown in Figure 4.1 below.
1 Operation Palagad 1973 was a rice production program implemented in 
the dry season of 1973 in Central Luzon provinces and the Southern 
provinces (Laguna and Rizal).
2 Lately, more provinces have been named as a result of the reorganiza­
tion under the New Society of the Philippines and some of the new 
provinces are included in the M-99 program.
3 Associate provinces are those provinces willing to join the program 
but which lack some of the resources like manpower, credit, irrigation 
and other input facilities. However, they are still allowed to adopt 
modern technology with some technical supervision.
MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES SHOWING MASAGANA 99 
PROGRAM TARGET PROVINCES
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The initial goal of the program in its first year of operation 
was to service about 1.0 million hectares of irrigated and rainfed areas 
(about one-third of the total rice area in the Philippines) in the 43 
priority provinces. As the program progressed from Phase I (May - 
October 1973) to Phase VI (November 1975 - April 1976), areas targeted 
to be planted with high-yielding varieties (HYVs) expanded and additional 
provinces were included1 2.
4.2 Organization and Management
The organization of the Masagana 99 Rice Production Program is 
depicted in chart form in Figure 4.2.
At the national level, Masagana 99 is run through a very broadly 
based National Management Committee (NMC) which represents numerous 
government and private entities. This Committee is responsible for 
designing operational strategies and formulates guidelines to solve 
problems in the process of program implementation (Appendix H).
Working side by side with the NMC are technical committees 
which determine and recommend the rice varieties and inputs that are 
used in the Program. Two important technical committees are the
2Fertilizer Technical Committee and the Pesticides Technical Committee.
1 One phase is equivalent to one cropping season or six months. 
Regularly, May to October is the rainy or wet season while November 
to April is the dry or "palagad" season.
2 The Fertilizer and Pesticides Technical Committees are composed of 
representatives from Bureau of Plant Industry, Bureau of Agricultural 
Extension, UPLB College of Agriculture, IRRI, Bureau of Soils, 
Fertilizer Industry Authority, Agricultural Pesticides Institute
of the Philippines and National Food and Agriculture Council.
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FIGURE 4.2
FUNCTIONAL CHART OF THE 
MASAGANA 99 RICE PRODUCTION PROGRAM
STAFF SUPPORT
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
INFORMATION COMMITTEE
REGIONAL COORDINATORS
NATIONAL
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
M-99 MUNICIPAL ACTION 
TEAM
M-99 PROVINCIAL ACTION 
COMMITTEE
PRODUCTION GROUP LEADERS 
FARMER-COOPERATORS
The National Information Committee promotes the information 
campaign of the program and is composed of various agencies, the most 
important of which are the Department of Agriculture, Bureau of 
Agricultural Extension, and Department of Agricultural Communication
in Los Banos, Laguna.
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At the provincial level, Masagana 99 is managed through 
Provincial Action Committees (PAG) headed by the Provincial Governor 
designated as chairman although the actual responsibility of running 
the program lies with the Provincial Program Officers (PPO) who are 
the vice chairmen of the Committees. These Committees are in charge 
of the overall implementation of the program in the provinces and
2.formulate policies within the framework of the existing program.
The local Municipal Action Team (MAT), patterned after the 
PAC, implements the program in the minicipalities and oversees the 
local management systems spread between production groups of 5-10 
farmers. Like the Governor, the Municipal Mayor is the chairman of 
the Team and is responsible for involveing the cooperation of the 
Barrio (village) Captains and farmers' leaders in the program activities.
The coordinated efforts of both private and government agencies 
make possible the on-going and effective implementation of the Masagana 
99 program. A list of the agencies associated with the program and brief 
descriptions of their functions/responsibilities is given in Appendix I.
4.3 Strategy of Implementation
The Strategy used for implementing the Masagana 99 Rice 
Production Program is multi-pronged involving supervised credit, a 1 2
1 Other members of the PAC are representatives from the Philippine 
Constabulary, Bureau of Plant Industry, Bureau of Agricultural 
Extension, Credit Supervisors of PNB, ACA, and RBs and Farm Rural 
Broadcasters and Federation of Farmers Association.
2 The Team is composed of the Mayor, production technicians, credit 
agents, Barrio Captains and production group leaders.
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package of technology, technical information and price support — all 
offered in a "package" form. The package is supported with integrated 
projects related to making necessary inputs available through a co­
ordinated effect of the participating agencies.
The main thrust of the program is the dissemination of credit 
with low rates of interest and with no collateral requirements. Thus 
most rice farmers are eligible to participate in the program. Super­
vision is provided to help farmers use the inputs efficiently as well 
as to ensure that the loans are used for productive purposes.
The loans given to farmers consist of a cash portion (covering 
the cost of land preparation, pulling and transplanting of seedlings 
and other labour activities) and an input portion (with chits covering 
the cost of fertilizers, chemicals, irrigation feed, and seeds).
Masagana 99 uses a package of technology which has been proven 
effective in various experiment stations in the country. The package 
includes the use of HYVs, the right amount of fertilizers, pesticides 
and herbicides, and the adoption of other cultural practices beneficial 
to increased rice output.
The supervision of farmers by production technicians is an 
important component of M-99 package. This supervision starts from the 
formation of a "selda" (joint-liability group) and is provided until 
the farmers repay their loans. Along with effective extension, con­
tinuous training and hiring of specialists is undertaken every year to 
strengthen technical and management skills in rice production. Moreover, 
technicians are supplied with motorcycles through a Special Vehicle Loan 
Fund so that they can supervise a wider range of farmers.
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An information and educational campaign sustained at the 
national, provincial and field levels through the established media 
is designed to strengthen local extension-information programs and 
encourage new farmers to support the local governments. Under this 
campaign, radio spots, mini dramas, jingles, press releases and leaf­
lets are produced and distributed to the Provincial Program Officers, 
production technicians,*, and farm broadcasters for further dissemination 
to farmers.
The availability of water in certain areas is being certified 
by the National Irrigation Administration particularly for the purpose 
of loan approval to prospective farmer-cooperators. For rainfed areas, 
the production technicians certify the water availability during the 
critical rice growing period. In collaboration with the technicians 
and rural broadcasters, the NIA agents schedule radio announcements on 
water use and management and schedule of water releases.
The allocation and distribution of fertilizers by grades at 
subsidized prices in programmed areas is undertaken by the Fertilizer 
Industry Authority (FIA). Distribution is carried out through a chit 
system whereby bags of fertilizer are distributed to farmers. A coupon 
system has been developed and is followed in the case of self-financed 
farmers.
In the same fashion a massive seed production program is 
being implemented by the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). The 
International Rice Research Institute and UP College of Agriculture 
are taking responsibility for the production of "foundation seeds". 
Foundation seeds are distributed to selected seed producers throughout
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the country for the production of "registered seeds" on a commercial 
scale. These registered seeds are then sold to seed grower cooperators 
the production of "certified seeds" to supply the requirements of 
the area covered by the program.
The registered seeds are purchased by the BPI at a price 
higher than the price of certified seeds and then stored in BPI ware- 
houses for distribution when the need arises. The Seed Inspector 
(deployed by the BPI) provides the technical supervision and is held 
responsible on matters pertaining to seed production, certification, 
procurement, and disbursement.
The Bureau of Plant Industry and Bureau of Agricultural 
Extension coordinate the pest and disease surveillance network at the 
provincial level. A system of visits is carried out by the production 
technicians at the field level. Where infestation reaches unacceptable 
levels the Provincial Action Committee mobilizes all the resources, 
agencies and civic groups in the campaign against pests and diseases.
Finally, a price support program is undertaken by the
National Grains Authority (NGA). At the farm level a price support
of )*0.70 per kilogram of paddy 0*35 per cavan of 50 kilograms with
1,214 per cent moisture content) was enforced in 1973-74. when the
1 At the same time, a ceiling price is enforced for milled rice to 
protect the consumers. This will not be discussed in detail here 
since some controversy prevails about this aspect of the program, 
and in any case it is not directly related to the Masagana 99 
program.
In CY 1974-75 the price support for paddy was increased to £*0.80 
per kilo then ^1.00 per kilogram (or ?50 per cavan of 50 kilos) 
in CY 1975-76. This needs to be further increased for farmers 
to have incentives to increase production.
2
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prevailing price falls below the price support, the NGA procures the 
paddy either directly or through a link-up system with authorized 
traders and millers. Further, the NGA provides adequate storage 
facilities for farmers' produce, especially in strategic production 
areas.
There are other inter-related activities of the program 
such as farm-to-market road improvements, artificial rain-making 
operations, flood control, etc., undertaken in conjunction with 
the Masagana 99 program, but the factors mentioned earlier are the 
major aspects of the scheme.
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CHAPTER 5
MASAGANA 99 PROGRAM COVERAGE, ACCOMPLISHMENTS
AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
This chapter discusses the coverage, accomplishments and 
some problems associated with the implementation of the Masagana 99 
Rice Production Program covering the period from May 1973 to April 1976. 
The data used in this chapter are taken primarily from the reports of 
the Management Information System (MIS) , from the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics (BAE) and from the lending institutions (PNB,
RBs, ACA). Other information is drawn from both published and 
unpublished sources.
Since data on Masagana 99 are gathered by the production 
technicians (PTs) and the financial institutions in the participating 
provinces and then summarized and transmitted to either NFAC or BAE 
where final processing and analysis is done, the estimates were not 
always exact measurements and some problems were encountered during 
data processing. Despite this shortcoming, these data are the best 
available at hand.
5.1 Alternatives to Increase Food Production
Before discussing the coverage and accomplishments of the 
M-99 program in detail, the alternatives available to the Philippine
1 The Management Information System (MIS) is a reporting system under­
taken by BAE, NFAC, and USAID to assist the Masagana 99 Program 
with systematic recording, reporting, and analysis of selected data 
for program management purposes (Smith, 1975).
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government to increase food production is worth considering at this 
point. In principle, in contemplating a program to increase food 
production, a government has one of many choices. Three of these 
choices are: (1) provision of price support for the farmers' output 
leaving the inputs to private markets, (2) no provision of price support 
but giving input subsidies, and (3) a mixture of price support for out­
put and subsidies for inputs. Like all the governments in the region, 
the Philippine government has decided to adopt programs to increase 
production by giving incentives on both the input and output sides.
These incentives are in the form of price support for farmers, ceiling 
prices for consumers and a lower price of fertilizers for food crop 
producers relative to export crop producers. In 1975, the price 
support for paddy was set at J?50 per cavan of 50 kilos and the ceiling 
price of milled rice was set at ?1.90 per kilogram. The public cost 
of this subsidy was reported to be about $US20 million in both FY 1974
and FY 1975. In the case of the fertilizer subsidy, the public cost
2rose from $US12 million for 1970-73 to about $US84 million m 1974.
The basic question therefore that the Government of the 
Philippines must ask itself is "Is the government revenue being spent 
in the best way, given the specific objectives?".
With the data presently available, it will not be possible 
to give a clear-cut answer to this question. It is still too early to 1 2
1 The Government of the Philippines, through the Fertilizer Industry 
Authority, adopted a two —tier price system, charging essentially 
the world market price for fertilizers used to grow export crops 
(sugar, bananas, pineapples) and a lower, subsidized price to 
producers of food grains (rice, corn, feedgrains).
2 These cost figures are taken from World Bank Country Report, 1976.
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judge how successful the M-99 program has been. However, the pre­
liminary results shown below indicate that the M-99 program has been 
moderately successful so far.
5.2 Area Planted and Harvested in Relation to Target Area
One of the major aims of the M-99 program is to plant a 
greater area with HYVs of rice with the present available technology 
and input resources available in the target provinces. Target areas 
are set in each phase to serve as guides to managers and implementers 
of the program in order to give an indication as to what and how many 
inputs are required and what the potential yields are.
After one year of implementation (May 1973 - April 1974), 
some Governors in the provinces left out of the program urgently 
requested the inclusion of their provinces and so the original 43 
priority provinces were increased to 55 provinces and 2 cities, and 
some 9 associate provinces.
The M-99 program had six implementation phases during the 
period being analyzed. In Phases I to IV the target areas were over­
achieved because the program was given "national priority" and the 
full attention of both government and private entities was concentrated 
on it. On the face of it, a slight reduction in the area planted
1 The Provincial Program Officers (PPOs) set their own provincial 
targets. Since each province differs in size, conditions and 
capacity to respond, it is expected that there will be wide variation. 
Although politically each province is important in its own right, 
for management purposes it is necessary to discern between those 
provinces that are major contributors and those provinces with 
token involvement.
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occurred in Phases V and VI compared with Phases III and IV (Table 5.1). 
In reality, however, this did not actually occur. In phase III, the 
M-99 program was strengthened through the implementation of a new 
"Direct Seeding Program" which was designed to maximize the use of land 
by planting another crop of paddy.^ Thus, a big jump in area planted 
under the M-99 program occurred in Phases III and IV. Unfortunately, 
in some provinces the area planted in Phase III was hard hit by typhoons 
in August and October 1974, while drought occurred in other areas.
A total of 95 thousand hectares was affected in 26 priority provinces. 
This accounted for 12 per cent of the outstanding area in the affected 
provinces (Appendix J). This caused a wider discrepancy between the 
area planted and the area harvested in Phase III (Table 5.2). To off­
set the probable losses incurred due to the calamities, a "recovery 
program" was included in Phase IV increasing the target areas to 579 
thousand hectares from original of about 400 thousand hectares. In 
effect, there was more or less the same coverage in Phases III and IV 
and Phases V and VI.
5.3 Production and Yield per Hectare
As mentioned earlier, the M-99 yield and production data were 
gathered by numerous production technicians all over the country. These 
sets of data were summarized and submitted to the Provincial Program 
Officers for submission to the National Food and Agriculture Council/ 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics. In turn, the NFAC/BAEcon finalized 1
1 Direct Seeding - planting of short-maturing varieties like IR 1561 
by direct seeding or broadcast methods on areas with sufficient 
and early rainfall that normally starts in April and May.
64
TABLE 5.1
MASAGANA 99 PLANTING PERFORMANCE, AREA TARGETTED AND 
PLANTED IN THOUSAND HECTARES
Planting Period
Target Planted %
re re re Accom-a
Phase I
(May 73 - Oct. 74 w 574.8 - 748.4 - 130
Phase II 
(Nov. 73 - April 74) — 425.2 — 452.6 106
Phase III 
(May 74 - Oct. 74) 901.6 _ 1160.3 129
Phase IV 
(Nov. 74 - April 75) — 579.3 — 686.8 119
Phase V 
(May 75 - Oct. 75) 1140.1 — 1084.8 _ 95
Phase VI 
(Nov. 75 - April 76) 646.3 660.4 102
WS - Wet season regularly from May to October (Phases I, III and V).
DS - Dry season regularly from November to April (Phases II, IV and VI). 
a - % Accomplishment = Area Planted/Target
Source: Management Information System (MIS) Reports, NFAC.
TABLE 5.2
MASAGANA 99 AREA HARVESTED AS PERCENT OF AREA PLANTED 
IN THOUSAND HECTARES
Phase Area Planted Area Harvested %
I 748.4 i 1111.6 92.5II 452.6 i
III 1160.3 1203.2 87.5IV 686.8 ■’
V 1084.8 1021.0 94.1
VI 660.4 645.0
Source: Management Information System (MIS) Reports and NFAC 
Annual Reports, 1973-74.
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the summary and analysis of the M-99 program, and estimates were not 
always exact measurements especially if no systematic sampling was 
employed. The task of collection and compiling production figures 
is a formidable one, and reduces the production technicians' effectiveness. 
Also, since production technicians were paid incentives on the basis of 
their performances the overstatement of reports is more likely to occur.
As the later residual drhalysis will show, the data reported by production 
technicians are clearly in error. Therefore, in interpreting these 
results, care must be taken.
Rice production in the Philippines has been reported to have 
been affected by institutional factors (i.e. tenancy problems and lack 
of credit to meet farmers' needs), environmental factors (i.e. rainfall, 
solar energy and the occurrence of typhoons and drought); and lack 
and inefficient usage of production inputs such as improved seeds, 
fertilizers, chemicals and irrigation. To tackle these problems a 
package of technology was developed and complemented with credit and 
the supervision of farmers. With the advent of Masagana 99 Rice 
Production Program a substantial increase in rice production was 
achieved in Crop Year 1973-74. Production increased from a low of 
100 million cavans in CY 1972-731 to a high of 127 million cavans in 
CY 1973-74. This was the highest production achieved to that date, 
higher by 5 per cent than the previous high of 121 million cavans in 
CY 1970-71, and 7 per cent higher than the average for the three years
1 However, it is noteworthy that the production of 100 million cavans 
for CY 1972-73 was artificially low due to the typhoons and drought 
that hit the country in that year. An analysis of production will 
follow in the chapter.
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1969, 1970, and 1971 of 119 million cavans (Appendix K). Production 
increased further to 128.6 million and 140 million cavans in 
GY 1974-75 and CY 1975-76, respectively.
Increased production resulted not only from increased yield 
per hectare but also from increased area sown. The area covered by 
the M-99 program increased from one-third to almost half of the total 
rice area harvested (3.58 million hectares) between Crop Year 1973-74 
and CY 1975-76 (Table 5.3). Considering the yield potential attached
TABLE 5.3
MASAGANA 99 PROGRAM AREA AND PRODUCTION IN RELATION TO TOTAL
RICE AREA AND PRODUCTION, CY 1973 -74 TO CY 1975-76*
Crop Year
Total Rice Masagana 99 % M-99
Area Prod. Area Prod. Area Prod.
1973-74 3.44 127.1 1.11 85.5 32.3 67.3
1974-75 3.54 128.6 1.20 83.4 33.9 64.8
1975-76 3.58 140.0 1.67 116.4 46.6 83.1
a - The area is in million hectares while production is in 
million cavans of 44 kilograms.
Source: MIS and BAE reports.
to HYVs of rice, the proportion of the area already covered by the M-99 
program, it is expected that production under the program will have a 
great bearing on national rice output. The expectation was realized, 
as indicated in Table 5.3. The contribution made by the area under 
M-99 ranged from two-thirds to four-fifths of total rice production
between CY. 1973-74 and CY 1975-76.
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Recently a report was presented that suggested that after 
only three years of M-99 operation,from May 1973 to April 1976, self- 
sufficiency in rice was attained and a buffer stock had been built up.
The availability of water is critical practically at all 
stages of rice growing. It is widely known that the high yielding rice 
varieties are highly responsive when irrigation is available. As such, 
to achieve the best results, it is desirable that M-99 package program 
is aimed mostly at irrigated areas. However, the availability of water 
in certain areas, particularly during wet or rainy season (as certified 
by the production technicians), made the M-99 program available to 
both irrigated and rainfed areas. The M-99 planting performance classi­
fied into irrigated and rainfed areas for Phases I to VI is summarized 
in Table 5.4. It can be seen that a large proportion of the M-99 pro­
gram areas is under irrigation, ranging from 68 per cent to 86 per cent 
of the M-99 total area planted in Phases I to VI. Rainfed areas 
ranged from 14 to 32 per cent, the highest of which occurred during the 
rainy season.
If we look at the total area harvested, shown in Table 5.5, 
we can see that the rainfed areas are substantially higher than the 
irrigated areas. This suggests that more efforts must be exerted to 
increase and improve the irrigation facilities through the country.
A brief discussion on irrigation will follow in the last section of 
this chapter.
1 Quisumbing and others, "An Evaluation of Masagana 99 Program", 
paper presented at the Conference of Strategic Factors in Rural 
Development in East and Southeast Asia, Manila, sponsored by 
the Council for Asian Manpower Studies, December 18-23, 1976.
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TABLE 5.4
MASAGANA 99 PLANTING PERFORMANCE IN IRRIGATED 
AND RAINFED AREAS
Phase
1000 Hectares Per Cent
IRR RF Total IRR RF
H HH 859 W 252 1111 77 23
hi 794 366 1160 68 32
IV 592 95 687 86 14
V 740 345 1085 68 32
VI 545 114 660 82 18
Source: MIS Reports, NFAC, Quezon City.
TABLE 5.5
TOTAL AREA HARVESTED: IRRIGATED AND RAINFED CROPS,
CY 1969-70 TO CY 1974-75
Crop Year
1000 Hectares Per Cent
IRR RF Total IRR RF
1969-70 1346 1767 3133 43 57
1970-71 1471 1642 3133 47 53
1971-72 758 987 1745 43 57
1972-73 1241 1871 3112 40 60
1973-74 1494 1943 3437 43 57
1974-75 1412 2127 3539 40 60
IRR - Irrigated 
RF - Rainfed
a - Only in 15 priority provinces.
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics Reports, Q.C..
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The average yield per hectare of paddy in irrigated and 
rainfed areas for both the Masagana 99 and the total rice areas are 
shown in Table 5.6. It was reported that the total average yield 
per hectare attained under irrigated crops increased from an average 
of 1.95 metric tons for the Crop Years 1970-73 to 2.25 metric tons in 
CY 1975-76. A closer examination of the figures in the Table revealed 
that the overall yield'per hectare of 1.72 metric tons in CY 1975-76 
had already been attained in CY 1970-71. In CY 1970-71, the increase 
in yield was attributed to HYVs, increased irrigation rates, and 
favourable weather. However, the yield declined substantially in the 
following crop year to 1.64 metric tons per hectare due to 21 typhoons, 
the Muslim-Christian conflict in Cotabato which severely reduced the 
production of rice and corn in the main producing areas of Mindanao, 
lack of agricultural credit, inability of the Rice and Com Administration 
(now National Grains Authority) to guarantee a floor price, and damage 
brought about by Tungro disease."*" A series of typhoons hit the country 
again in July to September of 1973 strongly affecting the rice crops of 
1972-73 and 1973-74. This brought about a reduction of 13 per cent 
from the production of the previous year.
With the implementation of the M-99 program the overall yield 
rose from an average of 1.59 metric tons for the three years of 1970-73 
to 1.72 metric tons in CY 1975-76. The M-99 average yield increased 
to 3.39, 3.04, and 3.08 metric tons in CYs 1973-74, 1974-75, and 
1975-76, respectively. The yield achieved in irrigated areas under M-99
1 See A.R. Tanco, Jr., "Harvests Way Below Targets", Manilla Times, 
pp. 1 and 8, August 20-21, 1971.
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TABLE 5.6
AVERAGE YIELD PER HECTARE OF PADDY IN IRRIGATED 
AND RAINFED AREAS UNDER MASAGANA 99 AND TOTAL RICE AREA, 
CY 1970-71 TO CY 1975-76
Crop Year
Total Averages M-99 Average Yield
IRR RF Overall IRR RF Overall
1970-71 1.99 1.47 1.72
1971-72 1.98 1.38 1.64
1972-73 1.89 1.11 1.42
1973-74 2.02 1.33 1.63 n.a. n.a. 3.39
1974-75 2.15 1.24 1.60 3.93 2.90 3.04
1975-76 2.25 1.34 1.72 4.25 2.95 3.08
a - Figures in metric tons.
Source: MIS and BAE reports.
averaged 3.93 metric tons in CY 1974-75 and 4.25 metric tons in CY 
1975-76 while under rainfed areas the yield averaged 2.90 metric tons 
and 2.95 metric tons over the same period. These are all substantially 
higher than the total yield averages. The reduction in M-99 yield in 
its second year of implementation reduced the overall yield from 1.63 
to 1.60 metric tons. The reduction was ascribed to 22 typhoons reported 
to have occurred in August and October of 1974.
As stated earlier, the proportion of the irrigated area under 
the M-99 program was high compared with the rainfed areas. It is unlikely 
that the overall M-99 yield would be closer to the rainfed yield than 
the yield under irrigated area. Although it was widely observed from
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Phases I to VI, that the bigger the production and area being reported 
the smaller the yield obtained, this does not seem to be the actual 
cause of the discrepancy of the overall M-99 yield and M-99 irrigated 
yield.
This may reflect the fact that the data reported in the MIS 
had some discrepancies and therefore need to be improved.
Taking all these into consideration, can the 8 per cent 
increase in yield from an average of 1.59 metric tons for the last 
three years of 1970-1973 to 1.72 metric tons in CY 1975-76 be considered 
substantial? This needs a closer examination but the data available 
suggest that it is still rather early to be sure of the reasons for the 
increases in yields since the disappointing years of 1971, 1972, and 
1973.
5.4 Volume of Loans, Area Financed, Farmers Served and Loan Repayments
The target areas to be financed are submitted to the rural banks, 
Philippine National Bank, and Agricultural Credit Administration for 
allocation of agricultural loan funds from their portfolio. The arrange­
ment was for the PNB to provide 50 per cent of the total loans required 
by the program with 45 per cent coming from rural banks, and the rest from 
ACA.
1 It should be noted that the calamities brought about much destruction 
of properties and loss of lives in the affected provinces. In 
particular, infrastructures like roads, bridges, irrigation 
facilities and others were heavily affected - all of which needed 
to be rehabilitated, entailing considerable time and cost.
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The total loans granted to farmers amounted to 2.7 billion 
pesos for Phases 1 to VI (Table 5.7). This was more or less consistent 
with the target proportion of loans assigned to the three lending 
agencies.
TABLE 5.7
MASAGANA 99 VTOTAL LOANS GRANTED BY INSTITUTION, 
CY 1973-74 TO CY 1975-76
Institution Loans Granted (Billion Pesos) % Share
Philippine National Bank 1342.7 49
Rural Banks 1269.6 47
Agricultural Credit 
Administration 101.9 4
Total 2714.2 100
Source: Reports from PNB, RBs and ACA as of December 1, 1976.
The total loans granted by phase shown in Table 5.8 indicate 
a falling trend. At first, loans increased from Phases I and II to 
Phases III and IV, respectively, However, a significant reduction 
occurred in Phases V and VI. This is true for both the total number of 
farmer-borrowers and the area financed. Table 5.9 shows the total area 
financed in relation to the area planted. It can be seen clearly that 
there is here also a falling trend.
This can probably be attributed to two factors. One is that 
farmers are probably moving towards self-financing and need less external 
financing. Secondly, due to non-repayment of loans, some farmers are no
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longer provided with credit and this has tended to bring about a 
reduction in the total area financed and in total loans granted. 
Which of the two factors has been most important is not as yet known, 
but further analysis in the next chapter will cast some additional 
light on the subject.
w TABLE 5.8
MASAGANA 99 LOANS GRANTED, AREA FINANCED 
AND FARMER-BORROWERS, BY PHASE3
Phase
Loans Granted 
(Million J?)
Area Financed 
('000 ha.)
3 bFarmers 
( 1000s)
WS DS WS DS WS DS
I 369.5 - 574.0 — 376.9
II 230.7 - 340.3 235.9
III 716.2 - 854.7 - 527.9
IV - 572.3 - 469.3 305.0
V 572.9 - 551.4 - 315.9
VI - 252.7 - 254.8 150.7
a - Reported by lending institutions as of December 1976.
b - As reported by MIS.
TABLE 5.9
MASAGANA 99 TOTAL AREA FINANCED
OF AREA PLANTED, PHASES
AS PERCENTAGE
I-VI
Area Financed Area Planted
Phase %
WS DS WS DS
I 574.0 — 748.4 - 76.7
II - 340.3 - 452.6 75.2
III 854.7 - 1160.3 - 73.7
IV — 469.3 - 686.8 68.3
V 551.4 - 1084.8 - 50.8
VI - 254.8 — 643.4 39.6
Source: MIS and lending institutions' reports.
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It should be noted, however, that starting in Phase V, the 
target area to be financed was reduced as a result of low loan collection 
and overloading of production technicians. Strict compliance was enforced 
by the lending institutions on the maximum of 200 farmers to be super­
vised by each individual technician (PNB Memorandum No. 67, August 1975) .
The loans granted mature within six months of release with an 
interest of one per cent a month. Out of total loans due of 2.71 
billion pesos, a total of 2.14 billion pesos had been repaid to the end 
of Phase VI, This is about 79 per cent of the total loans due. During 
the first two phases there was a good repayment rate as indicated in 
Table 5.10. However, as the program progressed, the loan repayment rate 
declined.
TABLE 5.10
MASAGANA 99 LOAN REPAYMENTS AS PERCENTAGE 
OF LOANS DUE, BY PHASE&
Phase
Loans Due 
(Million
Loans Repaid 
(Million ?) % Repayment
WS DS WS DS WS DS
I 369.4 . 345.2 93.4 —
II - 230.7 - 213.6 - 92.6
III 716.2 - 585.4 - 81.7 -
IV - 572.3 - 443.9 - 77.6
V 572.9 - 381.9 - 66.6 -
VI - 252.7 164.4 65.1
Total 1658.5 1055.7 1312.5 821.9 79.1 76.4
a — Reports as of December 1976 by lending institutions (PNB, RBs, 
AC A) .
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Problems started in Phase III when the area harvested dropped 
substantially due to the typhoons and drought mentioned earlier. These 
problems continued into latter phases because farmers were unable to 
recover immediately from the catastrophes. As a result, farmers had 
difficulty in paying back their loans. Accordingly, the repayment 
Pr°f)lems became more severe in spite of the good harvests claimed to 
have been attained in the latter phases.
This poses a difficult problem for implementors of the M-99 
program, particularly for the lending agencies. A credit program is 
a failure as a banking activity if it cannot recover the funds it lends 
to farmers. As a development activity, however, a subsidy might be 
justified on "infant industry" arguments. On the other hand, even if 
banking and development criteria do not justify a subsidy, the objective 
of improved welfare (which is usually one important aim of an agricul­
tural credit program) might justify a subsidy particularly in the case 
of a national disaster.
Several studies were undertaken to find out the real causes 
of non-repayment. One of these is an analysis of agricultural credit 
(short-term) non-repayment problems in the Philippines for CY 1973-74, 
jointly undertaken by BAE and PCAR. The results showed that the major 
cause for non-repayment was crop failure (76 per cent). This was 
followed by low production due to misapplication of loans (10 per cent),
1 Philippine Council for Agricultural Research-Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics Project No. 122, "An Analysis of the Agricultural Credit 
(Short-Term) Non-Repayment Problems in the Philippines, CY 1973-74", 
BAE, Quezon City, 1976.
76
borrowers not being accustomed to re-paying loans (8 per cent), and 
the attitude that loans are a government dole-out (2 per cent).
Another survey of debt repayment capacity of paddy farmers in Central 
Luzon was undertaken by Opelanio and others (1976). The results were 
similar to those of the PCAR-BAE joint study. Specifically, the 
reasons put forward were low production due to calamities, money 
being used for consumption, and loans not yet being matured. The same 
study pointed out that during the early stages of an inflationary 
period, farm prices tended to increase more rapidly than costs. Later, 
costs increased more rapidly than farm prices. This could have 
explained, at least in part, higher repayments in Phases I and II than 
in the latter phases of the M-99 program.
Due to the alarming problem of default a similar study was 
conducted by the Technical Board for Agricultural Credit, to examine 
rigorously the causes of this problem. The major findings contributed 
more specific and significant causes of low repayments. Aside from 
low production observed by the above studies, other reasons cited were 
waiting for better prices, the burden of debts other than M-99 loans, 
the selda (joint-liability group) concept, M-99 loans being used for 
other crops, farmers using the M-99 loan for the succeeding planting 
season, the poor quality of some technicians, non-acceptance of partial 
payments by banks, the dole-out mentality, and a host of other related 
factors.
1 See Preliminary Report of the Technical Board for Agricultural
Credit (TBAC), "Survey of the Causes of High Arrearages of Central 
Luzon Farmers in Phases IV and V of the M-99 Program", TBAC, 
Presidential Committee on Agricultural Credit, Manila, 1976.
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A study of some of the causes for increasing non-repayments 
suggests, among other things, that (1) whereas banking institutions 
took an aggressive approach in extending loans, they did not exercise 
sufficient effort in assessing credit worthiness, in keeping in contact 
with farmers during the cropping season, and especially in collecting 
loans at harvest time; (2) placing the Pts in the role of loan 
collectors is not consistent with their jobs of educating farmers; and 
(3) because the total loan was relatively small, some farmers might 
have assumed that they would not be forced to re-pay - in effect testing 
the non-collateral system. Although the interest rate of 12 per cent is 
relatively low, the rediscounting of loans at the Central Bank by 1 per 
cent suggests that M-99 loans should be profitable and that banks 
should be able to acquire capable staffs to make, supervise and collect 
loans (Quisumbing, et al., 1976).
These studies have pointed out that causes of non-repayment 
are related to economic, psychological, institutional and sociological 
factors - all of which are varied and interconnected in nature. There 
is no clear-cut solution to the above problems. However, several steps 
were undertaken and others are being tried to isolate and solve them. 
These steps included increasing the number of production technicians 
and agricultural credit supervisors and increasing incentives provided 
to them, restructuring of loans for borrowers who were unable to repay 
due to crop failure, reorganization and strengthening of the "selda" 
joint-liability groups, loan extension on a highly selective basis, 
and maintenance of existing loan ceilings per hectare. Further, a 
system of identifying farmers was developed.
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In cases where farmers refused to repay, the military 
authorities helped in the collection of loans. While the resort 
to authority may be regrettable in principle, in reality it was 
effective because some farmers were made to realize that it is 
imperative to repay the loans so that both they and other farmers 
can borrow again in the future. In very extreme cases such as where 
farmers were found to be "fake" farmers or non-existent, court trials 
were held to prosecute those responsible for the fraud. This was 
done to give farmers a warning and to encourage fraudulent farmers to 
repay the loans immediately. Figures for loan repayment can be 
expected to improve somewhat as some defaulters will eventually pay 
the loans.
5.5 Average Loan per Hectare and per Farmer-Borrower
An official loan per hectare figure which is expected to
cover all expenses involved in adopting the package of technology is
regularly set by the National Management Committee (NMC) (Appendix L).
In Phases I and II, a loan ceiling of J?700 was available per hectare.
This was increased to J?900 in Phases III and IV and J*1200 for the 
2latter phases. These increases were made to accommodate price increases 
of inputs (fertilizers, chemicals, etc.) as a result of devaluation and 
spiralling of oil prices after 1974. 1 2
1 The Philippine Constabulary (PC) became a member of the National 
Management Committee when problems of this sort occurred in the 
early phases of the M-99 program (see Appendix H).
2 On a case to case basis, a total of ?1600 per hectare would be 
available upon recommendation of the Provincial Action Committee 
(PAC) and approved by the NMC.
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The average loan per hectare ranged from J?643 in Phase I 
to ^992 in Phase VI (Table 5.11). Bearing in mind the amount of loans 
required and available to them, it seems clear that, in general, 
farmers did not borrow the total loan per hectare which was made 
available to them. However, it is also possible that farmers did not 
want to avail themselves of the cash portion of the loan allocated for 
labour expenses as they"relied on their own labour and that of the 
family members which were supplied without cash outlay.
TABLE 5.11
AVERAGE LOAN PER HECTARE AND PER FARMER-BORROWER, BY PHASE
Phase
Average Loan in Pesos ()?)
Per Hectare Per Borrower
I 643 980
II 678 978
III 838 1357
IV 1119 1876
V 1039 1813
VI 992 1677
Source: MIS Reports.
5.6 Production Technicians and Numbers of Supervised Farmers
The designation "Production Technician", or PT, was applied 
to any technician assigned to assist farmers in relation to the M—99 
production program. Most people assigned were from the Bureau of Plant 
Industry (BPI) or the Bureau of Agricultural Extension (BAEx). The PT's 
role in supervising farmers is vital in the successful implementation
of the M-99 program.
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It must be pointed out here that the farmers supervised by 
the PTs can either be with or without credit. Table 5.12 summarizes 
the total number of farmers with or without credit. The farmers 
supervised increased from Phases I and II to Phases III and IV, respect­
ively, and remained more or less the same in Phases V and VI.
TABLE 5.12
NUMBER OF PRODUCTION TECHNICIANS 
AND FARMERS SUPERVISED, BY PHASE
Phase No. OfPTs
No . of Farmers 
Supervised
Farmers per 
Technician3
W/Credit W/O Credit Total Range Average
I 3133 376.9 199.7 576.6 46-619 184
(65) (35) (100)
II 3095 235.9 139.0 374.9 10-320 121
(63) (37) (100)
III 3480 527.9 240.7 768.6 38-434 221
(69) (31) (100)
IV 3711 305.0 179.9 484.9 9-431 131
(63) (37) (100)
V 4413 315.9 390.9 706.8 53-392 160
(45) (55) (100)
VI 4104 150.7 343.4 494.1 27-575 120
(30) (70) (100)
a — Taken from Quisumbing and others (1976), An Evaluation of
M-99 Program. All the other figures were taken from MIS reports.
A closer look at the figures indicates a reverse trend; that 
is, farmers with credit decreased from Phases III and IV to Phases V 
and VI, respectively, while farmers who did not avail themselves of 
official credit supplies increased from a low of 200 thousand farmers
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in Phase I to a high of 343 thousand farmers in Phase VI. This seems 
to be consistent with the hypothesis that many farmers have become 
ineligible for loans because they did not repay earlier debts. However, 
it is quite consistent also with the probability that farmers are 
becoming self-financed in latter phases. An in-depth analysis needs 
to be done to see the real cause of the decline in loans granted.
Figures in brackets show the percentages of farmers supervised with and 
without credit by phase.
The increase in farmers supervised resulted from an increase 
in the number of production technicians assigned from Phases I to VI.
The ideal coverage of one production technician has been recommended 
to be about 150 farmers. But in Phases I to III, the load averaged 184 
and 221, respectively, and the range was wide in all phases. This 
suggests that some technicians had had a near impossible load to handle 
(Table 5.12). Hence, the number of technicians was increased to attain 
the appropriate coverage while maintaining the same number of farmers 
being supervised. No doubt, the high average loads of Phases I and III 
has affected the supervision provided by the PTs. Although the policy 
is to cover as many farmers as possible, under the M-99 program the 
farmers supervised stayed more or less the same for Phases III and IV 
to Phases V and VI, respectively. One of the reasons was the lack 
of trained graduates in agriculture to be hired to help implement M—99 
program, not to mention the lack of government funds. Furthermore, 
several production technicians experienced difficulty in contacting 
farmers because of the ‘lack of transport facilities. This problem was 
alleviated through a vehicle loan program designed to assist technicians 
in acquiring motorcycles at cost.
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It was observed that experiences in some countries like the 
Republic of China, Korea and Japan indicated that success in increasing 
productivity depended in part on the rate of adoption of innovations 
among farmers. This, in turn, influenced the quality of the agricul­
tural extension services and the role of farmer organizations (World 
Bank Country Economic Report, 1976). In the Philippines, this potential 
for promoting more rapid adoption has not been fully exploited. The 
role of extension workers (mostly called production technicians) , 
their relation with farmers and farmer organizations, and the inter­
relationships among the latter all deserve close attention. Therefore, 
the need is to upgrade the quality of the existing extension services 
rather than just to expand them.
5.7 Problems Related to Fertilizers, Pesticides and Irrigation
While the problems of low repayments, lack of technicians 
and others have already been treated in the proceeding sections, the 
problems associated with fertilizers, chemicals and irrigation have 
not been discussed. It would therefore be worthwhile discussing these 
problems in brief to get a clearer view of the subject matter.
One of the important factors that brought about increased rice 
production during the late 1960s and early 1970s was increased usage of 
fertilizers (Hsieh and Ruttan, 1967; Abad, 1974). This seems to be 
supported by the increasing volume of fertilizer consumed from 1969-74 
as summarized in Table 5.13. The volume of fertilizer increased from 
324.8 thousand metric tons in 1969 to 655.5 thousand metric tons in 
1974, an indication that the agricultural sector had become increasingly 
aware of the use and benefits of inorganic fertilizers.
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TABLE 5.13
VOLUME OF FERTILIZER CONSUMPTION, 1969-1974
Year 1000 m.t. Ratio ofFertilizer-Rice Price
1969 324.8 1.22
1970 434.0 1.56
1971 4*73.0 1.18
1972 563.0 1.13
1973 677.2b 0.80
1974 655.5b 2.50
a - Ratio of Urea fertilizer price to price of paddy (rough rice). 
b - Excludes imports of direct users and traders.
Sources: (1) Data from 1969-73, National Economid and
Development Authority.
(2) 1973 data from Fertilizer Industry Authority.
(3) World Bank "Agricultural Sector Survey: Philippines",
May 2, 1973.
However, the current World Bank reports stated that, despite 
the government's efforts to expand fertilizer usage, the application 
rate remains low (in 1973 only about 400 thousand metric tons were 
consumed) because of inadequacy of institutional credit to finance 
fertilizer purchases and an uneven distribution network which does not 
serve the more remote areas. Although detailed data are not available, 
this report expressed the feeling that a sharp drop in the use of 
fertilizers in rice areas occurred in CY 1974-75 as a result of a much 
less favourable fertilizer-rice price ratio (Table 5.11).
In order to realize the objective of rice production discussed 
earlier, it is necessary to improve the fertilizer distribution system
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and adjust the relationship between the price support for paddy and 
fertilizer prices. This will provide sufficient incentive for farmers 
to adopt modern technology.
As with fertilizers, the problems associated with insecticides 
are supply, high prices, and distribution system. During the early 
stages of the M-99 program farmers claimed that there were some short­
ages of approved insecticides. In CY 1974-75 occurrencesof insect
pests and rats were not uncommon. In the provinces of Laguna and Davao
2the rice crops were affected by "Hopper Burn". These sorts of problems 
were treated properly by mobilizing manpower and input resources at the 
local level to control these pests.
In any study of rice production, the aspect of irrigation 
deserves to be discussed even briefly because irrigation is considered 
one of the most important factors in increasing yields of paddy. As 
reported by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, figures from 1970-71 
to 1975-76 showed that the yield of paddy in the irrigated area is 
much higher than that of the rainfed area (refer to Table 5.6). This 
is so because there is greater control of water supply when irrigation 
facilities are available significantly allowing for more intensive 
cultivation of land. The uneven distribution of rainfall in different 
areas at different times, often causes substantial reductions in yields 
of paddy. Presently there is a dearth of adequate irrigation facilities 1 2
1 A Committee on Pesticides created by the National Food and Agriculture 
Council tests and approves different insecticides for the M-99 program.
2 Hopper Burn is damage to rice crops caused by brown planthoppers.
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in most rice growing areas rendering production in the dry season 
limited. If irrigation water is made available, rice can be grown 
twice or thrice a year increasing production and hence leading to 
better incomes.
The Philippine Government has given high priority to the 
expansion and improvement of irrigation systems together with the 
provision of adequate credit and other inputs. Increased investments 
are necessary in the construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of 
irrigation facilities - all of which are critical to the boosting of 
rice production and the promotion of agricultural development.
Under the Masagana 99 Rice Production Program, one of the 
requirements embodied in the package is the availability of water, 
particularly during the critical rice growing period. The National 
Irrigation Administration in collaboration with other government 
agencies is exerting all-out support for the expansion and improve­
ment of irrigation works to intensify land utilization.
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CHAPTER 6
IMPACT OF THE MASAGANA 99 RICE PRODUCTION PROGRAM
6.1 Trends in Production, Area and Yield
The most important part of this study is covered in this
V*
chapter where the importance of the Masagana 99 Rice Production 
Program is delineated in the context of increased production.
Several previous studies have examined the trends in the 
Philippine rice production, hectarage and yield. Venegas and Ruttan 
(1964) observed that the long-run trend in rice production from BY 
1902-03 to CY 1962-63 could be divided into four distinct periods.
From the early 1900s to the mid 1920s the trend was characterized by 
rapid increases, and then from 1926-27 to 1941-42 a period of stability 
occurred. There was a rapid decline and then a recovery between 
1941-42 and 1952-53, and finally a period of slow growth from 1952-53 
to the early 1960s. Towards the end of the period studied an increase 
in total production and average yield was achieved while there was an 
actual reduction in the area devoted to rice (Appendix M).
In separate studies Mangahas, et al, (1967) and Lawas (1968) 
both concluded that between the periods 1920-49 and 1949-60, the 
increases in rice production were largely tracable to area expansion 
rather than the average yield. Lawas further observed that there was 
even a decline in average yield per hectare from 26.16 cavans in 1949
to 25.7 cavans in 1960.
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A study by Pamatmat (1973) on the economics of production 
and pricing of rice from 1961 to 1970 indicated that within that 
period the hectarage devoted to rice decreased by approximately 3 per 
cent while production and average yield increased by 41 per cent and 
45 per cent, respectively. Pamatmat pointed out that the increase in 
production was not constant over the years but that much of the 
increase occurred in 1968 and 1970. Interestingly, in the year 1970, 
increase in production was ascribed to a substantial increase in yield 
due to increased hectarage being devoted to HYVs, increased usage of 
fertilizer and good weather (see Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). However, 
based on Figure 6.3 we can not easily say that yields increased from 
1961 to 1970. Neither can we say that there is a distinct upward 
trend over the entire period with a short "green revolution" effect.
It is rather difficult to conclude on this basis.
This chapter hopes to add to these previous studies by 
reviewing the pattern of rice production, area and yields for CY 1970-71 
to CY 1975-76. In doing this, it is hoped that the contribution of the 
Masagana 99 Rice Production Program implemented in May 1973 can be 
isolated.
The production, hectarage, and yield per hectare of paddy 
for the period 1961 to 1976 are shown in Figures 6.1 to 6.3.1 As indi­
cated, high production was attained in CY 1973-74 to CY 1975-76. On 
the other hand, production declined in CY 1971-72 and CY 1972-73 due
1 It was decided to join the trends between 1961-70 and 1971-76 for 
the purposes of clarity and continuity. Also, note that whenever 
rice production data is discussed CY 1970-71 is the same as 1971 
or vice versa unless specified.
Million cavans A FIGURE 6.1
TOTAL PRODUCTION OF PADDY (ROUGH RICE), PHILIPPINES,
1961-1976
FIGURE 6.2
TOTAL HECTARAGE DEVOTED TO PADDY (ROUGH RICE), PHILIPPINES,
,,,,,, 1961-1976Million hectares
3.10
FIGURE 6.3
NATIONAL YIELD PER HECTARE OF PADDY (ROUGH RICE), PHILIPPINES, 
Cavern per hectare 1961-1976
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largely to natural calamities. When examined closely it can be 
observed that, although there was an increase in area devoted to rice 
in CY 1971-72, total production declined because of a substantial drop 
in yield. As mentioned earlier, most of the crops failed due to the 
21 typhoons that hit the outstanding areas and the law and order 
problem in Cotabato greatly reduced the production of rice in the main 
producing areas of Mindanao. It seems apparent also that some expan­
sion in area was devoted to upland areas where yields were significantly 
lower than the national average yield. An increase in production 
occurred abruptly in CY 1973-74 when both area and yields increased 
substantially. More area was devoted to rice in the following year, 
but production only increased slightly due to another drop in yields. 
Finally, in CY 1975-76 total production jumped to a high level (140
million cavans) as a result of an increase in yields and a slight
1expansion in area.
As a conclusion, therefore, the increases in production from 
CY 1970-71 to CY 1975-76 could be ascribed largely to the expansion in 
area and only partly to an increase in average yield. Since the 
Masagana 99 program was implemented in 1973 it is possible that this 
program had contributed to the increase in total rice production within 
that period. If so, one may ask "to what extent did the M-99 program 
contribute to the increase in production?". To be able to answer this 
question, statistics on production, areas, and yield as reported by
1 A general pattern seemed to indicate that production somehow followed 
the yield or vice versa. This is to say that a drop (increase) in 
yields significantly reduced (increased) the production of rice 
during CY 1970-71 to CY 1975-76, holding the area constant.
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various government agencies, particularly the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics (BAE) and Management Information System (MIS) were examined. 
There were some problems of accuracy and consistency of data so the 
results of the analysis were verified by using other sources, such as 
research studies already conducted in assessing the performance of 
Masagana 99.
6.2 Method of Analysis
Two methods of analysis were used in attempts to measure the 
impact of the Masagana 99 program. First, a residual method was tried 
and, secondly, a regression analysis was used.
6.2.1 Residual Analysis
Using the residual method, the difference between two different 
sets of figures (total rice hectarage and production on one hand, and 
the Masagana 99 hectarage and production on the other) was taken to 
represent the figures for the remaining non-program area.
Based on the reported M-99 production and area, yields of 
the program were determined. These production and area figures were 
then subtracted from the national total rice production and area 
(reported by BAE), in order to arrive at a residual that could repre­
sent the production and area of the non-program area, that is, the 
Q^rea not covered by M—99 program. Based on these residual values 
(non—program production and area) the non—program yield was estimated.
The difference between the program and non-program yield was then 
multiplied by the reported program area to determine the contribution
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from CY 1973-74 to CY 1975-76. The summary of the residual results 
is shown in Table 6.1.
TABLE 6.1
SUMMARY OF RESULTS USING RESIDUAL ANALYSIS
Item ~
Crop Year
1973-74 1974-75 1975-76
TOTAL (Philippines)
Area Harvested 3.44 3.54 3.58
(Million Hectares)
Production 
(Million m.t.)
5.59 5.66 6.16
Yield (m.t.) 1.63 1.60 1.72
MASAGANA 99
Area Harvested 1.11 1.20 1.67
(Million Hectares)
_ . aProduction
(Million m.t.)
3.76 3.67 5.12
Yield (m.t.) 3.39 3.04 3.08
NON-PROGRAM
Area Harvested 2.33 2.34 1.91
(Million Hectares)
. aProduction 
(Million m.t.)
1.83 1.99 1.04
Yield (m.t.) 0.79 0.85 0.54
bYield Differential 2.59 2.19 2.54
Contribution from area 
under M-99c 2.87 2.63 4.24
% of Total Production 51 46 69
a - Converted from cavan of 44 kilograms, 
b - Total yield - Masagana 99 yield.
c - M-99 area x yield differential to represent the contribution 
from area under M-99 (in million metric tons)
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In CY 1973-74 the M-99 program average yield recorded a high 
of 3.39 metric tons (77 cavans of 44 kilos). A reduction of 11 per 
cent occurred in CY 1974-75 due to natural calamities that plagued the 
country in August and October of 1974. As a result, the national yield 
declined as well. In CY 1975-76 a considerable proportion of increased 
production seemed to have been contributed by M-99 area when the 
coverage increased to dlmost half of total rice area in that year plus 
an increase in yield, i.e. from 3.04 metric tons to 3.08 metric tons. 
This helped in increasing the national yield of 1.60 m.t. in CY 1974-75 
to 1.72 m.t. in CY 1975-76.
With regard to the residual values derived for CY 1973-74 
and 1974-75 the increase in non-program area and yield brought also 
an increase in non-program production. This can partly be explained 
by the so-called "fall-out" of the M-99 program where, because of the 
information campaign, some farmers adopted some of the rice cultural 
practices. However, due to the priority given to the M-99 participants, 
inputs were not readily available to non-Masagana farmers, hence yield 
did not reach the expected level.
In CY 1975-76 the non-program production, area and yields 
decreased. This prevented the national yield and total production 
from increasing by a larger amount.
The results of the residual method"*" showed that a significant 
proportion of the total rice production was contributed by the area 
under the M-99 program. In terms of output, this ranged from 2.87
1 The author has some reservations on this result as there is a strong 
feeling that an overstatement of the figures was derived.
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million m.t. to 4.24 million m.t. or between 46 per cent and 69 per 
cent of total production in the three years between CY 1973-74 and 
CY 1975-76.
In the last chapter, it was mentioned that under the Masagana 
99 Rice Production Program a large proportion was concentrated in 
irrigated area, i.e. from 68 to 86 per cent of the total M-99 area 
planted. To be able to make a realistic comparison between the M-99 
and the non-Masagana 99 areas, the figures that should have been used 
are those for the irrigated area. However, the lack of a complete 
series of data for M-99 classified into irrigated and rainfed for 
Phases I to VI prevented this sort of analisys from being done and 
therefore the aggregate figures (irrigated and rainfed) were used.
In interpreting the results of residual analysis it must be 
recognized that the upland rice area (about 15 per cent of the total 
rice area) has a substantially lower yield (average of 0.8 m.t.) than 
the rainfed area (average of 1.2 m.t.) and that the rainfed yield is 
also lower than the national - all reflected under the total area.
Mention must be made also that under the residual method employed, 
the effect of better land resources and other inputs (made available 
mostly for M-99 area) were counted under "program contribution". For 
these reasons, any errors in the statistics of the residual method 
would be magnified.
It is still too early to give a firm conclusion as to how 
much of the increased production can be attributed to the area under 
the M-99 program. However, there are reasons for being optimistic 
and the situation will become clearer after further years of the program.
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Some studies from the Philippines give grounds to believe 
that there are significant increases in production and yields. These 
studies will be taken in order to verify the results derived by using 
the residual method. A summary of three national surveys is presented 
in Table 6.2. These surveys conducted in 1974, 1975, and 1976, covered
~ TABLE 6.2
AVERAGE YIELD PER HECTARE OF M-99 PARTICIPANTS AND 
NON-PARTICIPANTS, CAVANS OF 50 KILOGRAMS1 2 3
Crop Year 
(Phase)
Participants Non-Participants 1
tDifferential
Yield
WS DS Ave. WS DS Ave. in cav. in m.t
1973-74 
(I & II) 54.1 54.7 54.3 47.7 45.0 46.8 7.5 0.375
1974-75 
(III & IV) 63.2 73.5 67.4 51.4 54.8 52.8 14.6 0.730
1975-76 
(V & VI) 66.2 63.5 65.2 53.5 49.6 51.7 13.5 0.675
a - These data are largely drawn from:
(1) Mariano, E.P., "Masagana 99: Phases I and II", Special
Studies Division, Department of Agriculture, L 74-6, 
Restricted, October, 1974 (1422 farms).
(2) Carlos, I.P., "Masagana 99: Phases III and IV", Special
Studies Division, Department of Agriculture, L 75-27, 
Restricted, September, 1975 (1476 farms).
(3) Carlos, I.P. and W.C. Vera Cruz, "Masagana 99: Phases V
and VI", SSD, D.A. L 76-35, Restricted, September, 1976 
(1499 farms).
b - Average Yield of Participants - Average Yield of Non-Participants 
(average for tvro sesons) on a per hectare basis.
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1422, 1476 and 1499 farms. The main aim of these surveys was to 
examine the performance of the M-99 Production Program. The results 
indicated that between M-99 participants and non-participants big 
differences in yields were achieved from CY 1973-74 to CY 1975-76.
These ranged from 7.5 cavans to 13.5 cavans or 0.675 metric tons per 
hectare within that period.
From these figures the M-99 area contribution was estimated. 
Table 6.3 summarizes the results indicating that M-99 contributed 
about 8 per cent of the total rice production in the same period. In 
terms of output these ranged from 0.42 million metric ton to 1.Y13 
million metric tons. In contrast, the first residual method gave a 
range of 46 per cent to 69 per cent contribution.
The results of the residual analysis showed that the official 
M-99 figures were overstated, most probably due to the aforementioned 
discrepancy of reports from the production technicians' level to the 
national level. It is quite unbelievable that the non-program yields 
could have been that low (from 0.54 metric ton to 0.85 m.t. between 
these periods).
Table 6.2 presents more realistic results since a systematic
2sampling procedure was employed. Even then, a selection bias might 1 2
1 These survey samples included both Masagana 99 participants and 
non-Masagana participants.
2 A predetermined sample was proportionally allocated to different 
regions based on NFAC and BAEcon reports of the cumulative number
of hectares planted under the Masagana 99 program, Phases III and IV.
This was done mainly to provide the proper statistical weights to 
all major rice areas. The major producing areas in each region were 
selected for the interviews. For each area, the sample farmers were 
selected as follows: 1/5 were randomly selected from the northern 
portion of the area; 1/5 from the southern; 1/5 from the eastern; 1/5 
from the western and 1/5 from the centre. The centre was allocated 
more samples in cases where the number of samples was not divisible by 5.
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TABLE 6.3
NET RESULTS USING YIELD FROM THREE NATIONAL 
SURVEYS - 1974, 1975 AND 1976
Item
Crop Year
1973-74 1974-75 1975-76
TOTAL (Philippines)
Area Harvested 
(Million Hectares)
3.44 3.54 3.58
Production 
(Million m.t.)
5.59 5.66 6.16
Yield (m.t.) 1.63 1.60 1.72
M-99 PARTICIPANTS
Area Harvested 
(Million Hectares)
1.11 1.20 1.67
Production 
(Million m.t.)
3.01 4.04 5.44
Yield (m.t.) 2.71 3.37 3.26
aYield Differential 
(m.t.)
0.375 0.730 0.675
Contribution from area 
under M-99 (Mil. m.t.)
0.42 0.88 1.13
% of Total Production 7.5 15.5 18.3
a - Taken from Table 6.2 between M-99 participants and non-M-99 
participants.
still be present. A more accurate result can be achieved by comparing 
respondents from M-99 area, barrios or municipalities with respondents 
from barrios or municipalities with no M-99 program at all. However, 
it may not be possible to do this as almost all provinces are now 
involved in the Masagana 99 program which is of high national priority.
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Even when these estimates of M-99 area contribution are 
reasonable, we must be cautious in accepting these results as they 
cannot represent the net benefits from the M-99 Rice Production Program.
A study of the economic implications of Masagana Programs by Agabin 
(1975) approximated that costs incurred during Phases I, II and III 
revealed an overall direct cost averaging ^185 per hectare (Appendix 0). 
When the indirect costd"were included, i.e. the net earnings foregone 
by the fertilizer industry and the opportunity cost of funds, the pro­
gram costs per hectare totalled ^311. These costs however, were 
believed to be grossly understated due to unavailability of other cost 
factors which should have been included in the computation. Since 
costs of fertilizer subsidies, extension services, and others entail 
tremendous cost to the government, there is an urgent need to compen­
sate these costs by increasing the benefits via increased yields.
However, even when the two results differed substantially from 
each other they both indicated an increasing trend suggesting that 
given more years of operation the M-99 impact will be felt more. It is 
rather early to judge at this stage, but the residual results showed 
some evidence of M-99 importance.
6.2.2 Regression Analysis
Before going to the regression analysis it might be worthwhile 
to discuss briefly the statistical assumptions of the Least Squares Model.
When using OLS approach three important statistical assumptions 
are considered, namely: (1) homoskedasticity, (2) non-autoregression,
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and (3) non-multicollinearity, in order to get an estimate which is 
unbiased and of minimum variance. The first two will no longer be 
discussed but the third assumption, namely that none of the explanatory 
variables is too highly correlated with any other explanatory variable, 
is highly important in this section. If this assumption is violated, 
there exists multicollinearity. On the contrary, whenever all explana­
tory variables are not^correlated with each other, there is an absence 
of multicollinearity. The cases in between are described by various 
degrees of multicollinearity. Therefore, the multicollinearity assump­
tion is a question of degree and not of kind. Thus# we do not test for 
multicollinearity, but measure its degree in any particular sample, if 
possible.
When we encountered multicollinearity, the estimated co­
efficients may probably be unreliable; variances may be large and the 
acceptance region for the hypothesis, that a given regression 
coefficient is zero, will be wide. This in turn, provides a weak, 
and hence not very useful, test for discriminating between true and
false hypotheses (Kmenta, 1971, p. 391). The respective regression
2coefficients may lack significance even when the R is extremely high. 
In this case the equation may be used for predictive purposes, but the 
contribution of the changes in independent variables to the changes in 
the dependent variable cannot be explained. In our purpose, it is 
always useful to examine the simple correlation between the explanatory 
variables to see whether or not multicollinearity is a problem. In 
circumventing this problem, a regression can be carried out, having 
the equation re-specified by omitting one of the highly correlated
variables.
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A regression analysis using Ordinary Least Squares Method 
(OLS) was carried out to find out if correlation exists between a 
dependent variable, rice production; and independent variables, time, 
area (total rice area harvested), dummy variable for HYV adoption, 
and another dummy variable for participation under the M-99 program. 
Observations on these variables were made over time, that is, with 
the use of time series data.
Equation (6.1) expressed the general linear relationship 
between the dependent variable Y. and the m explanatory variables
Y .3
m
= A. + B.X. . + E.0 i=i 1 3
where
Y.3 output in time j
X. . =13
amount of variable i used in time j
B.l coefficients associated with variable
> o I
I overall intercept (constant term)
E. error term in time j
3
Because of the few years of observation for both HYVs and 
2the Masagana 99 they are not easily comparable with majority of the 
observed years from CY 1909-10 to CY 1975-76, thus, the dummy variables 1 2
1 The principle behind the least squares estimation involves minimizing 
the sum of squared deviations of the observed values from their mean 
(Kmenta, 1971)•
2 Adoption of HYVs started in 1966, while the M-99 program was imple­
mented only in May 1973 (CY 1973-74).
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that were used will take into account the qualitative factors present 
in the adoption of HYVs and participation under the M-99 program.
So the actual equation becomes the equation expressed in (6.2) which 
we will call Model One.
Yj = A0 + Vl + B2X2 - B3X3 + B4X4 + Ej l6-2>
where
Y. = rice production in million cavans per year j
X = time variable in crop years
X2 = area variable in million hectares
X^ = dummy variable for HYV adoption
(which takes a value of one, zero otherwise)
X. = dummy variable for M-99 program adoption
(which takes a value of one, zero otherwise)
to - coefficients of X^ to X^ variables at different magnitudes
A = intercept (constant term)
Ej = error term or the least squares residuals.
Here, the error term E. may be composed of the measurement 
error in different variables used and the error due to the omission 
of other variables in the equation. In other words, E. may represent 
the effects of variables other than time or year of production, area 
harvested, dummy variable for HYV adoption and dummy variable for M-99 
program participation.
TO test for the goodness of fit of the regression equation,
it has become conventional in the literature of applied econometrics 
2to use R as a measure of association between independent variables
X's and dependent variable Y.
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An overall test of significance of the fitted regression 
Model One can be carried out by calculating the F ratio, regression 
mean square divided by error mean square. The F ratio is distri­
buted approximately as the F distribution with degrees of freedom k
and N-k-1, i.e. F • • •, where k is the number of variables and Nk, N-k-1
the number of observations. This ratio provides a test of the null
2hypothesis that R = Oir If we reject this null hypothesis (F value
larger than the tabulated F value at the desired probability level)
2then we can say that R is statistically significant.
On the other hand, if we wish to test for a specific 
regression coefficient the T statistic using Student's t distribution 
with N-2 degrees of freedom is used. If we reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients are equal to zero then we can say that they are 
statistically significant.
In this study, partial correlation coefficients between
independent and dependent variables were derived using the SPSS 
2routines. The correlation coefficients between independent variables 
are used as an indicator of the possible presence of linear or near 
linear relations among these variables. These coefficients are pre­
sented in Table 6.4. If the correlation coefficients are relatively
SSreg/k1 The formula for F =
2 lR /k
(1-R )(N-k-1)
where, SSreg is the sum of squares explained by the entire regression 
equation, SSres is the residual (unexplained) sum of squares, k is 
the number of independent variables in the equation, and N is the 
sample number (Nie, N.H., et al., 1975).
2 statistical Package for the Social Sciences (Nie, N.H., et al., 1975).
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high, one of the highly correlated variables should be dropped from 
the regression equation. However, which variable to omit and which 
to retain should be decided on the basis of the logic (physical, 
biological and economic) relevant to the production process being 
studied. In Model One, the highest correlation coefficients among 
independent variables are present in area (0.949) and time (0.939).
It can therefore be concluded at this stage that high multicollinearity 
is present in Model One. To help circumvent this problem of multi­
collinearity, the model can be re-specified by omitting one of the 
highly correlated variables. The independent variable area was found 
to have the highest correlation coefficient and was therefore dropped 
in the next equation (Model Two).
TABLE 6.4
CORRELATION (R) MATRIX FOR REGRESSION EQUATION OF 
PRODUCTION, PHILIPPINES, CY 1909-10 TO CY 1975-76
Variable Y X1 X2 X3 X4
Production 1.000
Time 0.939 1.000
Area 0.949 0.965 1.000
HYV Dummy 0.762 0.646 0.612 1.000
M-99 Dummy 0.511 0.359 0.371 0.486 1.000
The results of the regression analysis in Model One are 
summarized in Table 6.5. On the basis of F test, the entire regression 
explained 96 per cent of the observed variation in total rice pro­
duction as indicated by the coefficient of multiple determination
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corrected for degrees of freedom (R ). The whole regression was 
significant at the one per cent level of probability. The area, HYV 
dummy and the M-99 dummy had positive coefficients significantly 
different from zero at the 0.5 per cent probability level. However, 
the coefficient associated with time variable was significant only at 
the 10 per cent level of probability.
TABLE 6.5
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON RICE PRODUCTION
Independent
Variable Xs
Bi
Regression
Coefficient
Beta
SBi
Std. Error
of
Estimate
F T
Time X1 0.222 0.146 0.146 : 2.299 1.52*
Area X2 24.917 0.625 3.728 44.660 6.68****
HYV Dummy X3 18.286 0.230 2.725 45.010 6.71****
M-99 Dummy X4 16.310 0.115 3.993 16.680 4.08****
Constant Ao -5.042
R2 = 0.97
R ' = 0.96
* =: significant
* * n significant
* * * — significant
**** = significant
Std. Error = 5.836
F„ I = 408.426***
4,59
at the 10 per cent level 
at the 5 per cent level 
at the 1 per cent level 
at the .5 per cent level
—2 21 Adjusted R is an R statistic adjusted for the number of independent 
variables in the regression equation and the number of cases 
(Nie, N.H., et al., 1975).
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A closer examination of the specific regression coefficients 
for each of the independent variables showed that the highest contribu­
tion was made by the land area followed by the adoption of HYVs, M-99 
program participation and the time variable. In terms of production 
this means that an additional 24.9 cavans per hectare, i.e. 24.9
cavans per million hectares, was contributed by the land area. 
While all these variables were positive, the constant term had a nega­
tive coefficient indicating that the initial production of paddy is 
below zero (05.042). Since we know that this is not true, the entire 
regression model is unacceptable on this basis.
The standarized regression coefficient referred to as beta, 
shown in Table 6.4, is more convenient to use in our analysis. Working 
with these beta weights enables us to simplify the linear regression 
equation since the constant term A (the Y intercept) is always equal 
to zero and therefore can be omitted. Furthermore, when there are two 
or more independent variables measured in different units (such as time 
in years and area in million hectares), standardized coefficients pro­
vide the only sensible way of comparing the relative effect or 
importance of each independent variable on the dependent variable. On 
this basis, we can say that, of the four variables used in the regression, 
area is the most important independent variable in explaining production. 
This is followed by HYV dummy, time and the M-99 dummy. We can probably 
say at this point, that despite the short period of implementing the 
Masagana 99 program, quite an importance (11.5 per cent) is attached 
to it in estimating production.
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It might be well to mention that the data for the war years 
(CY 1942-43 to CY 1944-45) were not included in the series of data 
used in the regression analysis and therefore do not reflect the 
abnormality of wars, depressions, etc.
To improve the regression model a similar procedure was 
carried out (Model Two) regressing yield on independent variables 
time, HYV dummy and M-99 dummy. Due to a very high correlation (0.949) 
found to exist between area and production (and since production over 
area is equivalent to yield) dropping the area variable from the 
equation could equally substitute yield for the previous dependent 
variable production.^ The linear relationship is expressed in 
equation (6.3) as follows:
Yj = A0+ Vl + B2X2 + B3X3 + Ej
where
Y_. = yield per hectare in cavans in time j
X = time variable in years
X = dummy variable for HYV adoption
(which take a value of one, zero otherwise)
X^ = dummy variable for the M-99 program
(which take a value of one, zero otherwise)
to = coefficients of X^ to X^ at different magnitudes
Aq = intercept (constant term)
E. = error term or the least squares residual
(6.3)
1 There were other independent variables included in the regression 
equation like M-99 loan, total area planted under the M-99 program, 
and number of years of M-99 program but all these variables were 
finally dropped as they were found to be highly correlated with one 
another. Thus, the dummy for M-99 program can substitute for all 
these variables.
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Table 6.6 presents the intercorrelated between yield and 
independent variables time, HYV dummy and M-99 dummy. All independent 
variables were positively correlated with yield. The highest correla­
tion was between yield and time (0.748) and the least correlation was 
between yield and M-99 (0.475).
TABLE 6.6
CORRELATION (R) MATRIX FOR REGRESSION EQUATION OF YIELD, 
PHILIPPINES, CY 1909-10 TO CY 1975-76
Variable Y X1 X2 X3
Yield 1.000
Time 0.748 1.000
HYV Dummy 0.708 0.645 1.000
M-99 Dummy 0.475 0.359 0.487 1.000
The whole regression explained 64 per cent of the observed
variation in yield as indicated by the coefficient of multiple deter-
—2mination corrected for degrees of freedom, R (Table 6.7). The
regression in its entirety was significant at the 0.5 per cent probability 
—2level. Although R is relatively low, the results are probably better 
as indicated by the regression coefficients. Perhaps when other more 
important variables are present in the equation, the entire regression 
could explain more of the observed variation in yield.
The regression coefficients of time and HYV dummy were 
positively significant at the 0.5 per cent level of probability while
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the M-99 dummy was positively significant at the 5 per cent level.
The constant term AQ had 21.31 regression coefficient. In terms of 
yield, this indicates that the basic yield was 21.31 cavans per 
hectare. This result is more reasonable than the previous model 
although much lower than the average yield per hectare prior to the 
introduction of HYVs (about 28 cavans per hectare). Given time, yield 
increased at 0.13 cavan per hectare per year. When HYV adoption was 
introduced into the equation, an additional yield of 4.38 cavans was 
attained. When the M-99 program was introduced it contributed 3.43 
cavans per hectare. Taken altogether, the post HYV yield totalled 
25.82, while the post M-99 yield totalled 29.25 cavans per hectare.
The 3.43 cavans contributed by the M-99 participation is far below the 
differential yield between M-99 participants and non-participants 
(Table 6.2) which ranged from 7.5 cavans to 14.6 cavans in the same 
period (CY 1973-74 to CY 1975-76).
TABLE 6.7
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON YIELD
Independent
Variable Xs Coefficient
Beta
SBi
Std. Error
of Estimate
F T
Time X1 0.126 0.488 0.025 24.598 5.04* ** *** *
HYV Dummy X2 4.385 0.323 1.427 9.437 3.08****
M-99 Dummy X3 3.431 0.142 2.084 2.708 1.65**
Constant Ao 21.311
R2 = 0.66 Standard Error = 3.07
R2 = 0.64 F I 39.168****
3,60
* = significant at the 10 per cent level
** = significant at the 5 per cent level
*** = significant at the 1 per cent level
= significant at the,0.5 per cent level****
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Between HYV adoption and the M-99 program, the results showed 
that the HYV adoption exerted more impact in increasing yield of rice 
(4.38 cavans per hectare). In the light of this, it is worthwhile 
mentioning again that HYV adoption is part and parcel of the M-99 pro­
gram package and, therefore, it is hard to isolate the effect of HYV 
adoption from the M-99 program. It is possible that the effect of the 
HYV adoption embodied in the M-99 program had already been counted in 
the HYV adoption per se. On the other hand, it is also possible that 
HYV adoption by itself is actually more important in increasing yield 
than the M-99 program. It is still too early to draw firmer conclu­
sions at this stage and we need to have more observations of the M-99 
program to be definite in our conclusion. Nevertheless, it can be 
concluded that, based on the regression analysis (Model Two), evidence 
showed that the M-99 program had exerted an impact in increasing yield 
per hectare directly and indirectly boosting the total production of 
rice in the Philippines in CY 1973-74 to CY 1976.
The above findings suggest that policy makers should con­
tinue looking into the possibility of attaining higher rice productivity 
through improvement of the Masagana 99 Rice Production Program with 
support services like extension, credit, irrigation and marketing 
facilities in addition to a continuous research and development of new 
high yielding varieties of rice.
Another regression was carried out pooling cross-sectional 
and time series data to form a covariance model (Kmenta, 1971). The 
principle behind the covariance model is a supposition that each 
cross-sectional unit and each time period are characterized by their
own special intercept.
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It is known that yield of paddy differs considerably from 
time to time and from one location to another. Therefore this 
covariance model could be a more efficient way of estimating or pre­
dicting yield based on different independent varaibles and set of 
region and time dummies.
Eleven regions and eight years (cross-section and time 
series, respectively) were pooled together to arrive at our model. 
Independent variables such as % area irrigated, % area devoted to 
HYVs, volume of fertilizer used and area financed under the M-99 pro­
gram were used in regressing yield. In addition, dummy variables 
were used to account for regional and time differences (Appendix N).
The general linear relationship is expressed in equation 
(6,4) as follows:
Yit * A + BlXit + ' • • + Vif + Y2Z2t + V3t
+ + VW + X2™i2 + X3Wi3 + •••
+ A W. , + E. (6.4)T lT it
where
it 1 for the i'th cross-section data, 
0 otherwise (i = 2,3 ... N)
W =1 for the t'th time period, it
= 0 otherwise (t = 2,3 ... T)
Since we are introducing a bonafide constant into the model 
and because we are using a computer program that gives an intercept, 
it is essential that one dummy variable be dropped from each set of 
dummies. Otherwise, a linear dependency will be produced (Johnston, 1972).
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For our covariance model, the actual regression equation will 
be the following:
Yit = A + Vl + B2X2 + B3X3 +
11 8 11 8
+ E E mm. + E E X w.
i=2 t=2 1 11 i=2 t=2 t “
+ Eit „ <6-5>
where
Yit
X1
X2
X3
Z.l
wt
Bit
Yi
Xt
A
Eit
= yield in cavans per hectare in region i and time t
= % irrigated area in region i and time t
= % area devoted to HYVs in region i and time t
= % M-99 area financed in region i and time t
= dummy variables for region, where R = 2,3,  11
= dummy variables for time, where T = 2,3, ... 8
= coefficients associated with variables X , X„ and X12 3
= coefficients associated with dummy variables Z , Z , ... Z2 3 11
= coefficients associated with dummy variables W^, W , ... W 
= constant term or intercept 
S error term
The intercorrelations between the variables is indicated by 
the zero-order correlation coefficients in Table 6.8. Independent 
variables % irrigated area, % area devoted to HYVs, and % area financed 
under the M-99 program were positively correlated with yield. The 
highest correlation between yield and these variables was with % irri­
gated area (0.634). Four of the region dummies (RD7, RD8, RD10 and 
RDll) and two of the time dummies (TD2 and TD6) were negatively
TABLE 6.8
MATRIX OF SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG VARIABLES 
USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF YIELD BY REGION, PHILIPPINES, CY 1967-86 TO CY 1974-75
Variables Y X1 X2 X3 Z2 Z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z8
Yield 1.000
% IRR 0.634 1.000
% HYV 0.265 0.174 1.000
% M-99 Area
Financed 0.248 0.094 1.000 <
RD2 0.177 0.348 -0.114 -0.007 1.000
RD_ 0.510 0.376 0.095 0.230 -0.100 1.000
“>4 0.011 0.078 -0.008 0.013 -0.100 -0.100 1.000
rd5 0.071 0.215 0.228 -0.044 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 1.000
^6 0.018 -0.390 0.011 -0.036 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 1.000
rd7 -0.361 -0.352 -0.073 -0.044 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 1.000
^8 -0.310 -0.430 -0.091 -0.059 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 1.000
RD9 0.063 0.008 0.108 -0.025 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100
“>10 -0.238 -0.149 -0.131 -0.027 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100
%1 -0.061 0.059 0.111 -0.025 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100 -0.100
td2 -0.232 0.026 -0.225 -0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TE>3 0.153 0.011 -0.136 -0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
td4 0.155 0.161 0.046 -0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 000
TDC
D
0.042 -0.005 0.156 -0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 000 0.000
TD o^ -0,127 -0.002 0.227 -0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TD 0.113 0.025 0. 309 0.451 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CO
QEh 0.092 -0.090 0.291 0.666 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FLOOD 0.086 0.099 0.161 -0.053 -0.034 0.339 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034
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TABLE 6.8 (Contd.
Variables Zg Z^q Z]^ Wg Wg W4 Wg Wg W7 Wg ZgWg
Yield 
% IRR 
% HYV
% M-99 Area 
Financed
RD3
^4
^5
^6
rd7
RD8
RD 1.000
RD10 -0.100 1.000
Hi -0.100 -0.100 1.000
td2 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
td3 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.143 1.000
TD„4 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
TD 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
TD„6 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
TD 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
td8 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
FLOOD -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 0.284 -0.040 -0.040 1.000
IRRHYV 0.078 -0.147 0.119 -0.121 -0.092 0.118 0.083 0.144 0.238 0.114 0.196
X1X2
1.000
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correlated with yield. Most of the independent variables showed a low 
degree of intercorrelation, the largest being 0.469 between the % area devoted 
to HYVs. It was mentioned in Chapter 4 that M-99 loans consisted of 
cash and input portions. The cash portion was allocated for seeds and 
labour expenses. The relatively high correlation suggests that a greater 
area devoted to HYVs was under the M-99 area financed. As a whole, we 
can say that a multicollinearity problem does not exist in this model 
as indicated by the relatively low correlation coefficients.
The entire regression explained 66 per cent of the observed
variation in yield as indicated by the coefficient of multiple deter-
—2mination corrected for degrees of freedom (R ) and was significant at 
the 1 per cent probability level. Among the independent variables only 
the % irrigated area (X ) had a regression coefficient significantly 
different from zero at the 1 per cent level of probability. The % area 
devoted to HYVs had also positive coefficient but not significantly 
different from zero at the desired level (Table 6.9). The % M-99 area 
financed had negative regression coefficient (-0.029) but also 
insignificant. This might be due to small number of years observed 
for the Masagana 99 program. Hence, this is still inconclusive.
Looking more closely at the regression coefficients of 
regional dummies, the RD3 representing Central Luzon was outstanding 
It had a positive regression coefficient of 9.759 and was significantly 
different from zero at the 0.5 per cent level of probability. In terms 
of yield per hectare, this coefficient means an additional 9.759 cavans 
per hectare. Explanation could largely be attributed to a greater and 
better rice land area; that is, irrigation rates were high, more
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TABLE 6.9
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON YIELD PER HECTARE 
USING COVARIANCE MODEL
Variables Bi Beta
SBi
Std. F T
Error
% IRR X1 0.403 0.642 0.167 5.797 2.408***
0.477nS% HYV X2 0.066 0.133 0.138 0.228
% M-99
Area X3 -0.029 -0.059 0.097 0.093 -0.305nS
Financed
rd2 Z2 0.586 0.022 2.281 0.066 0.257nS
rd3 Z3 9.759 0.372 2.503 15.203 3.899****
^4 Z4 -0.432 -0.016 2.371 0.033 -0.182nS
^-5 Z5 0.725 0.027 2.897 0.063 0.25inS
^6 Z6 4.113 0.157 3.290 1.563 1.250nS
RD Z7 -5.195 -0.198 3.149 2.722 -1.650**
”a Z8 -3.288 -0.125 3.344 0.967 -0.983nS
nsRD„ Z^ 1.931 0.073 2.674 0.522 0.7229 9
RD Z, 1 -4.153 -0.158 2.709 2.349 -1.533*10 10 -0.556nSRD Zn , -1.466 -0.056 2.638 0.30911 11 -0.459nSTD2 W2 -1.085 -0.047 2.362 0.211
TD W„ 6.786 0.297 2.531 7.186 2.681****3 3
TD W, 6.014 0.264 2.993 1.037 2.009**4 4
TD Wn 5.325 0.233 3.212 2.748 1.658**5 5 nsTD w. 2.414 0.106 3.330 0.525 0.7246 6
TD? W7 7.889 0.346 3.655 4.659 2.158**
TD Wn 8.312 0.364 4.157 3.997 1.999**8 8 ns
FLOOD Z3W6 -2.436 -0.034 5.500 0.196 0.443 „ ns
IRRHYV X1X2 -0.003 -0.381 0.003 1.010 -1.005
Constant AO 15.787
R2 = 0.75 
—2R = 0.66
F = 8.733****22,65
* = significant at the 10 per cent level
** = significant at the 5 per cent level
*** = significant at the 1 per cent level
**** = significant at the .5 per cent level
ns = not significant
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farmers adopted HYVs, farmers were more accessible to extension, credit 
and marketing facilities, and other support services that were not always 
readily accessible to other regions in the country. A significant but 
negative regional dummy was RD7 which represents Central Visayas. This 
implies that yield in Central Visayas was lower than the yield in other 
regions. In Central Visayas, the main crop is sugar. Further, their 
staple food is not rice Biit corn and most farmers tended to grow sugar 
and corn instead of rice. The lower yield in this region can also be 
partly explained by the heterogeneity in farming.
All of the time dummies had regression coefficients that were 
positive except for TD2 (CY 1968-69). The coefficient associated with 
TD2 was -1.085 but insignificant at the desired level and therefore is 
inconclusive. What seems to be more interesting is that, starting from 
TD3 (CY 1969-70) to TD8, regression coefficients all became positive.
TD7 and TD8 had coefficients of 7.889 and 8.312, respectively, and were 
both significant at the 5 per cent probability level. The M-99 program 
was implemented in TD7 and TD8. There is, therefore, a clear possibility 
that the M-99 program implemented in these years contributed to the 
increase in yield of paddy. In quantitative terms, TD7 contributed 
about 8 cavans per hectare. The same holds true for TD8. The entire 
regression indicated that the most important variable that explained 
variation in yield was the % area irrigated.~ The % area devoted to HYV 
also explained some variation in yield. However, it was not significantly 
different from zero at the desired level and therefore inconclusive.
The fluctuations in the coefficients of regional dummies implied that 
there were substantial variations in yield from one region to another.
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The most important regional dummy was RD3 representing Central Luzon.
It suggests that it might be worthwhile concentrating on bringing even 
greater areas of Central Luzon under rice production.
The regression results showed that for every one per cent 
change in irrigated area available there came about an increase in yield 
of 40.3 cavans. For a 1 per cent change in area devoted to HYVs an 
additional 6.6 cavans was attained, and so on. The negative but insig­
nificant coefficient for M-99 area financed implies that the program 
had not exerted much impact yet. However, it is still inconclusive 
and rather too early to draw firm conclusions especially as the year 
effect dummies may be taking up the true Masagana 99 effect as the pro­
gram was promoted in the first two years. When more quantifiable explana­
tory variables are available for a longer period, more definite conclu-
2sions might be made.
It was cited earlier in this section that each cross-sectional 
unit (regional dummies) and each time period (time dummies) were charac­
terized by their own special intercept. To examine this characteristic, 
two regression analyses were carried out again. The sets of dummy 
variables were expected to pick up some effects from other independent
variables. When the set of time dummies was dropped from the regression 
—2equation, the R declined to 57 per cent while the intercept became 
8.86 (Table 6.10). On the other hand, when the set of region dummies
1 This is because the units in the data set were in terms of percentages 
written as 48.6, 32.4, etc. rather than in decimals .486, .324, etc. 2
2 Fertilizer usage has been considered very important in explaining 
yield variation. However, due to unavailability of regional volume 
of fertilizer used, the fertilizer variable was not used in the 
regression equation, although the yearly volume of fertilizer figures 
for the whole country were available.
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_owas excluded, retaining the time dummies in the equation, the R further 
reduced to 51 per cent and the intercept decreased to 1.57 (Table 6.11). 
Results were quite similar except for the following changes.
TABLE 6.10
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON YIELD PER 
HECTARE, BY REGION3
SBi
Variables Bi Beta Std.
Error
F T
% IRR X1 0.552 0.880 0.172 10.338 3.215****
% HYV X2 0.282 0.570 0.114 6.153 2.480***
% M-99
Area 11 0.055 0.110 0.047 1.380 1.175nS
Financed
RD2 Z2 0.811 0.031 2.520 0.104
ns0.322
RD3 Z3 8.494 0.324 2.682 10.029 3.167****
RD4 Z4 -0.678 -0.026 2.609 0.068
ns-0.261
RD5 ■ -0.049 -0.002 2.815 0.000 0.000D nsRD6 Z6 4.027 0.153 3.539 1.295 1.138
RD7 Z7 -4.534 -0.173 3.427 1.750 1.323*
RD8 Z8 -2.429 -0.092 3.630 0.448 -0.669nS
RD9 Z9 1.449 0.055 2.816 0.265 0.515nS
RD10 Z, 1 -3.146 -0.120 2.977 1.116 -1.056nS10 -0.696nSRD11 z,, -1.922 -0.073 2.764 0.48411 -0.767nSFLOOD Z3W6 -4.397 -0.062 5.734 0.588
IRRHYV X1X2 -0.006 -0.735 0.003 4.295 -2.072** *** ****
Constant A0 8.863
R2 = 0.65 
R2 = 0.57
F | 8.817****15,72
* = significant at the 10 per cent level
** = significant at the 5 per cent level
*** = significant at the 1 per cent level
**** = significant at the .5 per cent level
ns = not significant
a - The set of time dummies was dropped from the regression analysis.
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TABLE 6.11
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON YIELD PER HECTARE, 
CY 1967-68 TO CY 1974-753
SBi
Variables Bi Beta Std.
Error
F T
% IRR X1 0.750 1.196 0.150 24.753 4.975****
% HYV X2 0.342 0.692 0.151 5.143 2.268**
% M-99
Area X 0.160 0.319 0.090 3.137 1.771**
Financed 3
TD2 W2 -3.024 -0.132 2.591 1.362 -1.167nS
TD3 W3 4.393 0.192 2.740 2.570 1.603*
TD4 W4 2.637 0.115 3.056 0.745 0.863nS
TD5 w5 2.112 0.092 3.275 0.416 0.645nS
TD6 W6 -1.729 -0.076 3.391 0.260 -0.510nS
TD7 W7 -0.177 -0.008 3.939 0.002 -0.045nS
TD8 W8 -1.497 -0.065 4.502 0.111 -0.333nS
FLOOD Z3W6 7.306 0.102 5.762 1.607 1.268*
IRRHYV X1X2 -0.008 -1.026 0.003 6.822 -2.612****
Constant Ao 1.570
R2 = 0.58 
R2 = 0.51
F12,65 8.561****
* = significant at the 10 per cent level
** = significant at the 5 per cent level
*** = significant at the 1 per cent level
**** p significant at the .5 per cent level
ns = not significant
a - The set of regional dummies was dropped from the regression 
equation.
The positive coefficient associated with % area devoted to 
HYVs increased tremendously from 0.066 to 0.282 when the time dummies 
were ignored. Interestingly, the negative coefficient associated with
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% area financed became positive. However, on the basis of t statistic 
(1.175) it is barely significant. In quantitative terms, this would 
mean that for every 1 per cent increase in area financed under the M-99 , 
the national yield increased by 5.5 cavans per hectare. In other words, 
when a farmer participated in the M-99 program, he would have an increase 
in yield of 5.5 cavans. This 5.5 cavans is not unreasonable when compared 
with the differential yield of 7.5 to 14.6 cavans suggested in the three 
national surveys reported in Table 6.2. Similarly, a 1 per cent increase 
in area devoted to HYVs led to a 28.2 cavans increase in yield per hectare.
The intercept term declined from 15.787 to 8.863 and, finally,
to 1.57. On the basis of these characteristics, it is reasonable to say
that the dummy variables which represented the regional differences gave
more explanation in the observed variation in yield than the time dummies
—2as indicated by big changes in the respective R and intercept.
To see the effect of some interactions between regions and 
time or between dummies and independent variables, interaction dummies 
could be created. We know for a fact that flood, typhoons and drought 
affected the production of rice in the Philippines. Therefore, by 
looking at certain regions at a certain time of year where a flood 
occurred, we can see how the interaction phenomenon affected the yield 
per hectare. For instance, an interaction dummy variable FLOOD was 
created to reflect the phenomenon in RD3 (Central Luzon) in TD6 (CY 
1972-73). As indicated by the regression coefficient of FLOOD 
(Tables 6.9 and 6.10) it was associated with negative coefficient not 
significantly different from zero. This probably suggests that 
possible explanations of yield variation could be attached to FLOOD,
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but this is inconclusive again. Another interaction variable, IRRHYV, 
i.e. % IRR x % HYV, was created to see the impact of combining the two 
explanatory variables. This is because it is generally assumed that 
water control is of vital importance to high yielding rice varieties. 
The result did not show this, however. A possible explanation for this 
is the impact of high yielding varieties in many of the best rainfed 
areas is in fact greater*than irrigated areas. Clearly, this is a very 
interesting result that needs further investigation.
The three regression coefficients for IRRHYV imply that the 
changes in effects of interaction term were lower than the contribution 
of just the % IRR and just % HYV.
In conclusion, the regression analyses presented in this 
chapter provide some suggestive evidence that the M-99 Rice Production 
Program may have exerted some impact on increased production which is 
our main argument in this study. It is difficult to sort out the M-99 
effect from the pure time effect in the data set used in the regression 
analysis. The result does not prove or disprove the M-99 impact.
To date then, the three national surveys undertaken by the Special 
Studies Division of the Department of Agriculture provide the best 
estimates of the results of the impact of the Masagana 99 program. 
However, the results in this section are sufficiently informative to 
encourage a similar analysis when more detailed data over a longer time 
period become available: for example, regional breakdown of inputs - 
particularly fertilizer.
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6.3 Other Effects of the Masagana 99 Program1
It must be stressed that there are other important benefits 
not quantified in the preceding sections. These will be discussed 
very briefly below.
Research in the Philippines has established that increases 
in employment occurred as a result of adopting modern technology such 
as the use of HYVs, fertilizers and chemicals (Barker, et al., 1972). 
Cultural practices like weeding, application of fertilizers and chemicals 
all required additional labour. Harvesting and threshing as a result of 
the increased yield attained required additional labour too. The early 
maturing varieties planted under the direct seeding method made it 
possible to grow a second crop, not necessarily rice, and this further 
increased the demand for labour thus increasing employment.
Moreover, when income is increased through the adoption of 
HYVs and other inputs, increases in incomes in other sectors of the 
economy are usually induced through multiplier effects. For instance, 
farmers would increase demand for vegetables, poultry and livestock 
which then provide greater scope for increasing intensity of labour 
utilization, raising incomes and improved welfare.
The Masagana 99 program provided a means for bridging the gap 
between experimental and farm levels of operation. Support services 
such as supervision of farmers, field demonstrations, the supply of
1 For more details, see Meliza Agabin, "Economic Implications of 
Masagana Programs". Paper presented to the First Agricultural 
Policy Conference, UPLB College, Laguna, Philippines, April 14-16, 
1975.
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production technicians, and the dissemination of information through 
the mass media were provided as part of the Masagana 99 program. These 
proved effective in disseminating and diffusing technology.
Undoubtedly, the Masagana 99 Program provided some backward 
and forward linkages in various sectors of the entire economy. Some 
activities which have experienced push effects from the Masagana 99 
program are seed growing, services related to the supply of inputs, 
marketing of output, banking services, and transport. To varying 
degrees, therefore, the M-99 program not only contributed increased 
production but has generated employment and thus helped improve rural 
welfare.
Similarly, no analysis has been attempted in this study as to 
the costs of Masagana 99. A complete evaluation of the program will 
necessitate not only a detailed examination of the benefits but also 
the real costs incurred.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The agricultural sector has played, and for the foreseeable 
future will play, a major role in the Philippine economy. It is 
therefore imperative to^develop this sector through a substantial 
amount of both government and private assistance in the form of 
extension services, credit, marketing arrangements, infrastructure 
like irrigation and flood control facilities, farm-to-market roads, 
and other related services.
Generally, Filipinos are rice eaters, so rice will remain 
the most important food crop for a long period. Further, the Government 
of the Philippines is concerned to win the race between food production 
and population growth, so agricultural development programs, particularly 
rice production programs, will continue to have high priority.
Governments of many developing countries like the Philippines 
vigorously pursued the implementation of agricultural credit programs 
to increase food production and improve rural welfare. The experiences 
of Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka presented in 
Chapter 2 proved to have significant results and were important in 
attaining desired objectives, both directly and indirectly. There 
seemed to be a strong demand for agricultural credit in the countries 
surveyed. However, it must be stressed that care should be taken in 
considering credit as the vanguard of agricultural development for, 
while credit is often found necessary, it is only one of the instruments
in promoting agricultural development.
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Moreover, it is interesting to note that, despite the weak­
nesses of agricultural credit programs, these are still being advocated 
in most developing countries. Perhaps the governments of these 
countries have strong beliefs that credit programs can effectively 
improve the welfare of the majority of the people.
To refer back to the past, it is quite disappointing to learn 
that while various efforts have been made in the Philippines to develop, 
promote, and expand rural credit facilities, institutional sources of 
credit have not provided enough credit to the agricultural sector for 
more than seven decades. It is true that the volume of agricultural 
loans provided has increased. However, improvements in financing are 
needed not only in terms of size and number of loans, but more so in 
the modification of lending policies and procedures. Often, compli­
cated lending procedures have precluded small farmers from loan pro­
grams in the past. Some characteristics of formal lending institutions 
such as interest rates and collateral requirements were pointed out 
both in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. A flexible interest rate was pro­
posed, preferably set at about 8 per cent in real terms, although in 
practice the real interest rate would probably rise and fall with the 
rate of inflation. At the present time, the inflation rate in the 
Philippines is about 8 per cent per annum which suggests that an 
interest rate of perhaps 16 per cent would be appropriate. It was also 
revealed in Chapter 3 that there had been no real growth in the amount 
granted for almost ten years before the Masagana 99 supervised credit 
scheme was initiated in 1973. This new supervised credit program, 
which was accompanied by other liberal policies (such as no collateral 
and joint liability groups), offered a possible solution to small
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farmers' credit problems and is expected to improve the real growth of 
agricultural credit in the years to come. Although the available results 
are worthwhile examining, it will be several years before firmer con­
clusions can be drawn about the full effectiveness of the program.
In the late 1960s, the Philippine Government had implemented 
both food production programs (rice and corn production programs) and 
agricultural credit programs in isolation from each other. It was only 
in 1973 that the Government recognized that agricultural credit could 
not be used effectively by itself. A package composed of technology, 
farmer supervision, available inputs, price support and credit was 
therefore developed and implemented and is called Masagana 99 Rice 
Production Program (M-99).
The Masagana 99 program is a large, multifaceted, relatively 
well-conceived, organized, coordinated and implemented program. As 
such, its weaknesses and successes are of great importance and interest 
to both the Philippines, who will gain from the Masagana 99 experience, 
and to other developing countries who may wish to implement similar 
types of programs.
The objective of rice self-sufficiency has been attained in 
three years of operation. The increase in total production of paddy 
attained between CY 1973-74 and CY 1975-76 was due to both increased 
area and increased yield. Increases in yield appear to have been 
attained due to the increased usage of inputs that were made available 
during the M-99 implementation. The m-99 supervised credit program 
provided a total of 2.7 billion pesos for Phases I to VI. These loans 
generally flowed to those who needed them for production purposes and
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were able to increase yields because of them. About 600,000 farmers, 
both with and without credit, were provided with supervision by about 
3600 production technicians every cropping season. Undoubtedly, some 
farmers who did not participate under the M-99 program benefitted also 
from the M-99 program in the areas of information, price support, 
subsidies, etc. It therefore seems reasonable to say that, generally, 
the M—99 program reached'’ small farmers and provided them with credit 
and supervision that caused them to increase their yields raising their 
incomes.
This all suggests that the program went well, but a close 
examination of loans granted, the number of farmer-borrowers and area 
financed revealed that there was a decreasing trend. Two hypotheses 
were put forward in Chapter 5 to explain the situation: (1) that 
farmers moved toward self-financing and needed less (or no) external 
financing, and (2) that some farmers were no longer provided with loans 
by lending institutions because they did not make prompt repayments.
Both explanations appear to be consistent with the results of the 
analysis in the same chapter, but the latter seems a more realistic 
explanation because there were decreasing repayment rates in the latter 
phases. However, no definite conclusions can be drawn until stronger 
evidence is available to test the two hypotheses.
The Masagana 99 program is not without problems and to evaluate 
the scheme the accomplishments have to be balanced against the problems. 
Inclement weather, pests and diseases, availability of fertilizers and 
chemicals (affected by supply, distribution and high prices), lack and 
inefficiency of some production technicians and many related factors all
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affected the smooth implementation of the program. While increased 
production was attained, these problems, coupled with an alarming rate 
of non-repayment, encumbered the M-99 program. Various efforts were 
undertaken to mitigate these problems and it is clear that more effort 
and more time will be needed to make this program work efficiently.
While the program required a lot of Government funds, these can be 
justified on the grounds, of development and improved welfare, particu­
larly in the case of a national disaster.
To digress, the Government might consider the possibility of 
initiating a crop insurance scheme in order to protect rice farmers 
from risks of crop failures due to typhoons, droughts, pests and 
diseases. Whereas the expenses of farmers would necessarily be increased 
because of cost of premiums, the protection provided by crop insurance 
in terms of a reduction in uncertainties and income fluctuations would 
benefit the farmers. For a crop insurance scheme to work, it would 
need to be implemented in a manner that rural banks could operate and 
be administered by a central authority.
To evaluate properly any economic program, including agricul­
tural credit programs, information on the value and distribution of the 
benefits and costs (both economic and social) should be available and 
for a program to be called a success the benefits must exceed the costs. 
This study has not included a cost-benefit analysis for want of suffiy 
cient information, but has tried to show the contribution made by the 
Masagana 99 program using residual and regression analysis.
The analysis in Chpater 6 showed that, while high production
was attained from CY 1973-74 to CY 1975-76, the main reason was not
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increased average yield per hectare as expected but increased area 
(from 3.44 to 3.58 million hectares). This, however, does not negate 
the substantial increase in yield achieved under the M-99 areas (the 
average yield was 3.39 metric tons in CY 1973-74 and 3.08 metric tons 
in CY 1975-76), but it appears that it will take several more years 
before the real impact of the M-99 program can be felt - that is, when 
a full recovery from th€" effects of previous natural hazards has 
already been realized.
As verified with the results of three national surveys under­
taken by Special Studies Division, Department of Agriculture, the 
residual analysis indicated that the contribution of the area under 
the Masagana 99 program averaged about 14 per cent of the total rice 
production a year, which is promising. The regression analysis looked 
only at some available variables and tried to test if correlation 
existed or not. Using production as the dependent variable and inde­
pendent variables such as time, area, dummy variable for HYV adoption 
and dummy variable for Masagana 99 participation, the results showed 
that positive correlations existed and were all significant at the 
desired level of probability. Interestingly, despite only three years 
of implementation, the M-99 program had exerted quite an important 
influence on yield as indicated by its beta coefficient (11.5 per cent).
Another regression was carried out using a covariance model 
(pooling cross-section (regions) and time series data) (CY 1967-68 to 
CY 1974-75). The results proved that yield differs significantly from 
region to region and from time to time. But, the regional differences 
explained more of the variation in yield than did the time differences.
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The overall result: is still inconclusive for the set of data was not 
able to prove or disprove the claimed impact of the M-99 program. 
Perhaps it would take more years before the actual impact of the pro­
gram can be sorted out. Only then can we be firm in our conclusion.
The overall findings suggest that policy makers and imple­
mentors of development programs should exert more effort in looking at 
ways of increasing food production, particularly rice. This can be 
done through improved services such as irrigation, extension, credit, 
marketing, and other facilities in addition to continuous work on 
research and development of new technology (HYVs, fertilizer and 
chemicals).
It must be mentioned that there are many important factors 
that affect rice production other than just the quantifiable variables 
used in our analysis. The as yet unquantifiable variables in package 
may have either constrained or boosted the effects of the Masagana 99 
program. Hence, no definite statement can be made until the effects 
of these other factors can be observed for a longer period.
The various sectors of the Philippine economy also felt the 
push effects of the Masagana 99 program activities, especially in 
services related to marketing of inputs and outputs, banking and 
transport. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that, to varying 
extents, the Masagana 99 Rice Production Program contributed to high 
production, generated employment and thus improved rural welfare.
Because the Philippine population is increasing at a rapid 
rate (3.0 per cent per year) there is a need not only to sustain the
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present level of production but also to exert greater effort to meet 
food requirements and thus win the race between food production and 
population growth.
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APPENDIX A
A CALENDAR OF VARIOUS MEASURES ADOPTED 
TO ALLEVIATE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT PROBLEMS 
IN THE PHILIPPINES (1903-1963)
1903 - The Banco Espanol Filipino was reincorporated under a special 
charter. Originally chartered in 1851, it was authorized to 
grant loans up to 20 per cent of its paid-up capital, based on 
mortgaged or titled real estate.
1907 - The first official move to tackle the problem of agricultural
credit was taken on the initiative of the Philippine Commission. 
It tried to induce private capital to invest in an agricultural 
bank by authorizing the Insular Government to guarantee an annual 
income of five per cent to individuals and corporations willing 
to invest. However, nobody availed himself of this Agricultural 
Banks Act.
1908 - The Agricultural Bank of the Philippine Islands was established
with a capital of one million pesos. Limited capital, which was 
frozen in no time in long-term loans, lack of trained personnel, 
and absence of rediscounting facilities, gradually reduced the 
effectiveness of the Bank in meeting the needs of agricultural 
development. From its inception in 1908 up to 1916 when it was 
merged with the newly organized Philippine National Bank, the 
Agricultural Bank extended an aggregate of £>5,028,560 in loans.
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1915 - Act No. 2508, the Rural Credit Law, was passed authorizing the
establishment of a system of agricultural credit cooperative 
associations to operate and function under accepted cooperative 
principles and practices. This Act was the culmination of a 
series of attempts by Filipino leaders to introduce into the 
Philippines a system of cooperative credit. The law was inopera­
tive for a year, until an amendment to the Act placed it under 
the Bureau of Agriculture. A Rural Credit Division was formed 
in that Bureau to supervise the implementation of the Act.
By 1939, after 23 years of operation, only 35,041 members of a 
total membership of 105,084 availed themselves of the facilities 
of the 571 associations organized in 43 provinces. Actually, 
in terms of operations, none of these associations- are active 
today.
1916 - The Philippine National Bank was established with a capital of
7>20 million to supplant the Agricultural Bank of the Philippine 
Islands, primarily to engage in commercial banking. The Bank's 
charter provided for the granting of loans for agricultural, 
industrial and commercial purposes. Except for initial diffi­
culties encountered between 1917 and 1922, the PNB has been a 
major instrument in promoting national economic development. 
Although the bank has attempted to serve the credit needs of 
farmers, it has not adequately met the problem of rural credit.
1919 - Act No. 2818 appropriated one million pesos to set up a Rice
and Corn Fund for loans to farmers through the rural cooperatives 
organized under Act No. 2508 for the purpose of promoting and
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increasing the production of rice and corn. The Fund became 
the principal source of funds for the agricultural credit 
cooperative associations. It has undergone several changes in
name. In 1936, it was changed to Agricultural Cooperative Fund 
to include marketing cooperatives in its sphere of operations.
In 1940, it was renamed the National Cooperative Fund and placed 
under the National Trading Corporation.
1924 - Guanco Act (Act No. 3154) was passed authorizing the establish­
ment of agricultural banks with a minimum capital of ^50,000.
Only one bank was organized under this Act and this was the 
short-lived bank of Pangasinan.
1930 - A Rural Bank Commission was created to study and recommend the
best way of effectively extending greater credit facilities to 
small farmers with the Philippine National Bank assuming the 
central role in this problem. According to Governor F. Davis, 
in his letter addressed to private banks and other institutions,
"one of the main difficulties confronting the small farmer appears 
to be his inability to obtain adequate credit facilities without 
paying a very high price for them".
1931 - The Philippine National Bank was authorized by Act No. 3895
to regulate the creation and operation of rural credit associations, 
and by a companion measure, Act No. 3896, to organize rural 
banks. The Bank was clothed with superior powers to control 
and supervise cooperative credit societies and private rural 
banks. Only seven associations were organized under Act 3895, 
and only two rural banks under Act 3896. There are no available 
records of their operations as these were destroyed during the war.
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1939 - The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was established under
Commonwealth Act No. 459 to meet demands for long-term capital 
funds. With a capital of ^150 million, the Bank, during its 
two and a half years of existence cut short by the last war, 
granted loans amounting to J*24 million for agricultural and 
J*4 million for industrial purposes. Its assets were absorbed 
by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation organized after the 
war.
1940 - Commodity Corporations, like the National Abaca and other
Fibers Corporations (NAFCO), National Coconut Corporation 
(NACOCO) and National Tobacco Corporation (NATOCO), were set 
up by the Government to deal with the particular problems of 
certain industries. These corporations engaged in lending 
operations mostly in the nature of marketing loans to stabilize 
commodity prices. The war reduced their operations and these 
government corporations have now been liquidated or their 
functions absorbed by other agencies.
1940 - A Special Fund of one million pesos was given to the Bureau of 
Labor to be loaned to farmers in Central Luzon. Small farmers 
could borrow from this Fund provided they organized themselves 
into cooperative credit associations.
1947 - The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, established under
Republic Act No. 85, with an authorized capital of ?300 million, 
started operations on January 2, 1947. It was entrusted with 
the responsibility of providing long-term financing for the 
rehabilitation, development and expansion of agriculture, commerce
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and industry, the reconstruction of property damaged by the 
war, and the diversification of the national economy. In the 
eleven and a half years of its existence, the RFC granted 
?407.2 million of real estate loans, ?225.1 million of agri­
cultural loans, and ^347.5 million of industrial loans.
1952 - Republic Act No. 720 (Rural Banks Act) was passed, providing 
for the creation, organization and operation of a system of 
rural banks throughout the country, designed to give easy 
credit facilities on reasonable terms to small farmers, small 
merchants, small industries and cooperatives. The rural banks 
program was devised in such a way as to make rural banking as 
simple as possible and adapted to the set ways and low level 
of education of the rural people. Since the opening of the 
first rural bank on December 31, 1952 until December 31, 1963, 
a total of more than 660 million pesos has been loaned to about
1.2 million borrowers, by the 257 rural banks in operation in 
223 municipalities and 29 chartered cities in 50 provinces 
throughout the country.
1952 - The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration 
(ACCFA) was established with the enactment of Republic Act 
No. 821, with a capital of 100 million pesos. Under its Charter, 
it is charged with the dual function of developing a farmer- 
owned and farmer-controlled marketing system and of providing 
credit on liberal terms and conditions to farmers1 cooperative 
marketing associations involving a total membership of 310,731 
farmers. Since the start of the program in 1952, up to mid-1963,
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loans of various types released totalled £*204.4 million out
of a paid-up capital of ^40.5 million and Central Bank borrowings
of £*148.7 million, of which £*124.2 million has been collected.
The balance of receivables stood at £*80.2 million.
1958 - The Development Bank of the Philippines replaced the former 
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, with the approval of 
Republic Act No. 2081 on June 14, 1958. It was established for 
the purpose of providing credit facilities for the development 
and expansion of agriculture and industry, for the diversification 
of the national economy, and for promoting the establishment of 
private development banks in provinces and cities. Its capital 
was increased from JP300 million to £*500 million. As of June 30, 
1960, the combined operations of the Rehabilitation Finance 
Corporation for eleven and a half years and its successor, the 
Development Bank of the Philippines for two years, resulted in 
the granting of 88,900 loans totalling ^1,225.9 million, 
including £*289 million of agricultural loans, J?448.2 million of 
industrial loans, and £*412.5 million of real estate loans.
1959 - On January 20, 1959, the Development Bank of the Philippines
inaugurated its 50-million-peso agricultural loans program which 
included small loans to farmers in amounts not exceeding 2,000 
pesos payable in ten years. The objectives of the small 
agricultural loans program are to increase and diversify agri­
cultural production, to encourage effective farming practices, 
and to improve the processing of locally grown agricultural
products.
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1963 - With the passage of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(R.A. No. 3844), the ACCFA was reorganized into the Agricultural 
Credit Administration, and given an additional appropriation of 
^150 million. Lending activities of the ACA are to be directed 
to stimulate the development and operation of farmers' cooperatives. 
(Adapted from Tablante, 1964)
From 1964 onwards, the agricultural credit policies had been 
geared toward liberalizing the lending procedures and channelling more 
fund resources to the agricultural sector, but it was only recently that 
funds became available to the agricultural sector and credit became 
accessible to the small farmers.
APPENDIX B
DBF'S FINANCING PROGRAM FOR RICE AND CORN FARMERS, 1975
Financing Program Eligible Borrowers Amount of Loan ,, , Interest RateCollateral , .(per annum)
Terms
of Payment
1. Cereal (Food 1. Farmers presently 1. Loan is based 1. First mortgage 12 per cent 1. Not to
Grains) engaged or who on actual costs on privately- for loans exceed 2
Production propose to engage of project and owned titled above ^5000 years for
in rice and corn on debt repay- or untitled operation
production, who ment capacity real estate 9 per cent and main-
want to improve of the crop property; for >5t U1 O o o tenance.
operations. financed. Chattel on and below
Loans will not farm machinery 2. For per-
exceed J?1000 and other manent
per hectare for durable assets; improve-
commercial rice Group borrowers/ ments not
production and farmers coopera- to exceed
J?700 per hectare tives are 10 years.
for commercial secured by a 3. For acqui-
corn production. guarantee, i.e., sition of
they are jointly draft
and severally animals -
liable for loan 5 years;
repayment. and
machinery -
7 years.
2. Certificate of 
Land Transfer 
holders (CTL)
Holders of CTL 
using the same 
collaterals for 
DBP1s cereal pro­
duction financing
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APPENDIX B (contd.)
Financing Program Eligible Borrowers Amount of Loan Collateral Interest Rate (per annum)
Terms
of Payment
3. Grain Processing 
and Storage
1. For integrated 
facilities - 
cooperatives/ 
associations 
organized with 
capital stock 
owned by Philippine 
citizens.
1. Based on actual 
needs of the 
project.
2. For capital 
assets - more 
than $2000 or 
peso equivalent.
1. Real estate 
property, 
paddy stock 
both 
existing 
and to be 
acquired.
9 per cent for 
loans ^5000 
and below
12 per cent 
for loans 
above ^5000
1. Payable 
for 14 
years 
including 
1 period 
on princi­
pal
2. Payable m
2. For modernization 
and expansion 
programs - those 
on rice business 
with.successful 
ongoing rice 
storage.
10 years 
with one 
year grace 
period.
4. Irrigation Pump Farmers owning 
agricultural lands; 
farmers whose real 
estate properties 
are encumbered; 
and leaseholders
A maximum of 
?8500 per annum.
Applicants 
with total 
cash equity 
equal to 10 
per cent of 
irrigation 
pump costs.
12 per cent
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APPENDIX C
PNB'S FINANCING PROGRAM FOR RICE AND CORN FARMERS, 1975
Financing Program Eligible Borrowers Amount of Loan Collateral InterestRate
Terms of 
Payment
Supervised Credit 
Schemes
1. Paddy
a. Masagana 99 
crop loan
Rice farmers 
following the 
recommendation of 
supervised credit 
technician
Actual cost of 
essential items to 
be financed not 
exceeding ^1600 
per hectare.
Any of the 
following:
a. 1st lien
on real estate 
property or 
livestock or 
crop ;
b. Joint- 
liability group
12 per cent 180 days
b. M-99 Commodity Rice farmers with 
stored crops 
financed by PNB 
crop loan
Additional amount 
up to 80 per cent 
of the value of 
stored crop 
(current market 
value)
Stored crops 
enough to cover 
both crop and 
commodity loan
9 per cent 90 days
APPENDIX C (contd.)
Financing Program Eligible Borrowers Amount of Loan Collateral InterestRate
Terms of 
Payment
2. Corn
a. Mas aganang 
Maisan Crop 
Loan
Corn farmers 
adopting farm 
practices under
PNB supervised 
credit scheme
Actual costs of 
essential items to 
be financed not to 
exceed J?500 per 
hectare
Same as colla­
teral for M-99 
crop loan.
12 per cent 180 days
b. Masaganang 
Maisan 
Commodity
Loan
Corn farmers with 
stored crops 
financed by PNB 
crop loan
Additional amount 
up to 80 per cent 
of the value of 
stored crop
Stored crops 
enough to cover 
both crop and 
commodity loan
9 per cent 90 days
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APPENDIX D
RURAL BANKS' FINANCING PROGRAM FOR RICE AND CORN PRODUCTION, 1975
Financing Program Eligible Borrowers Amount of Loan Collateral Interest Rate (per annum)
Terms of 
Payment
1. Ordinary
Agricultural
Loan
Rice and corn 
farmers owning or 
cultivating not 
more than 50 
hectares of land.
50 per cent of No
the value of 
established 
production the 
previous year.
collateral. 12 per cent Not
exceeding 
one year, i
2. Masagana 99 
Program
Rice farmers who 
are members of 
"selda" or 
"Samahang Nayon" 
barrio 
association.
?1600 per 
hectare.
12 per cent 6 months
3. Masaganang
Maisan Program
Same as M-99. ?500 per 
hectare.
- 12 per cent 6 months
4. CB:IBRD Rural 
Credit Project 
(Machinery, 
Equipment and 
Irrigation 
Facilities)
Farmers owning or 
cultivating not 
more than 50 
hectares of land.
Loans not exceeding 
70 per cent of the 
appraised value of 
real estate colla­
teral or 50 per 
cent of approved 
value of movable 
property.
12 per cent 3-10 years 
payable 
annually or 
semi-annually
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APPENDIX E
ACA'S FINANCING PROGRAM FOR RICE AND CORN PRODUCTION, 1975
Financing Program Eligible Borrowers Amount of Loan _ , J1, n Interest RateCollateral (per annum)
Terms of 
Payment
Production Loan a. Organized rice 
farmers (compact 
farms or mutual 
assistance groups);
b. Agrarian reform 
farmers in landed 
estates and settle­
ment areas;
c. land transferees 
and lessees in 
tenanted areas;
d. Owner-cultivators 
of not more than 
seven hectares of 
land.
Actual need of 
farmer-borrower 
and the repay­
ment capacity 
but not exceeding 
60 per cent of 
the value of 
expected crop.
Any of the 
following:
a. Pledge of 
crops financed 
to ACA ware­
house under 
marketing 
contract;
b. Real estate 
mortgage;
c. Chattel
mortgage on 
livestock/ 
equipment/ 
machinery, 
d. Two co­
makers of a 
joint- 
liability 
group.
12 per cent Two months
after
harvest
Note: For more complete details, see "Lending Agencies for Rice and Corn Farmers 1975", Philippine Council for 
Agricultural Research, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines.
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APPENDIX F
SOURCES OF FARM CREDIT (CASH
(Percentage)
AND KIND)
Source 1954-55 1965-66 1971-72
FACOMA, ACA, ACCFA 11.0 22.0 13.2
DBP, PNB, Rural and
Commercial Banks1 1.0 14.0 14.4
and others
Total Institutional 12.0 36.0 27.6
Landlords 39.0 64.0 10.8
Relatives and Friends 6.0 - 25.4
Merchants 1.0 - -
Private Money Lenders 42.0 37.2and others^
Total Informal 88.0 64.0 73.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
1 Includes credit union and other loan associations
2 Includes self-finance.
Sources: (1) L.P. de Guzman, "An Economic Analysis of the Methods
of Farm Financing Used on 5,144 Farms", Philippine 
Agriculturist, Vol. 41, January 1958. 2 3
(2) FHDO, Farm and Home Development Office - Report 1966-67, 
UPCA, Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines.
(3) BAEcon, Integrated Farm Indebtedness Surveys, 1971-72.
(Adapted from Gelia T. Castillo, All in a Grain of Rice, 
SEARCA, 1975.)
APPENDIX G
MASAGANA 99 PROGRAM TARGET PROVINCES IN 
DIFFERENT REGIONS
I. ILOCOS REGION
1. Abra1 2
2. Ilocos Norte
3. Ilocos Sur
4. La Union
5. Pangasinan
II. CAGAYAN VALLEY
6. Cagayan
7. Isabela
8. Kalinga-Apayao
9. Nueva Viscaya
III. CENTRAL LUZON
10. Bataan
11. Bulacan
12. Nueva Ecija
13. Pampanga
14. Tarlac
15. Zambales
IV. SOUTHERN TAGALOG
16. Batangas
17. Cavite
18. Laguna
19. Mindoro Oriental
20. Mindoro Occidental
21. Palawan"*"
22. Quezon
23. Rizal
V. BICOL REGION
24. Albay
25. Camarines Norte
26. Camarines Sur
27. Sorsogon-*-
VI. WESTERN VISAYAS
28. Aklan
29. Antique
30. Capiz
31. Iloilo
32. Negros Occidental
VII. CENTRAL VISAYAS
33. Bohol
34. Negros Oriental
VIII. EASTERN VISAYAS
35. Leyte
36. Leyte Sur
37. Northern Samar
IX. WESTERN MINDANAO
38. Zamboanga City
39. Zamboanga del Sur
40. Zamboanga del Norte
X. NORTHERN MINDANAO
41. Bukidnon
42. Agusan Norte
43. Agusan Sur^
44. Lanao Norte
45. Lanao Sur
46. Misamis Oriental
47. Misamis Occidental
48. Surigao Norte^
49. Surigao Sur
XI. SOUTHERN MINDANAO
50. Cotabato
51. Cotabato South
52. Maguindanao^-' ^
53. Sultan Kudarat '
54. Davao Norte
55. Davao Oriental
56. Davao Sur
57. Davao City
1 Additional provinces for Masagana 99 program.
2 Previously part of Cotabato.
APPENDIX H
Chairman:
Members:
NATIONAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
National Food and Agriculture Council
Representatives from -
Bureau of Agricultural Extension
Bureau of Plant Industry
Philippine National Bank
Agricultural Credit Administration
Bureau of Agricultural Economics
Central Bank-Department of Rural Banks,
Savings and Loan Associations
Land Bank
Fertilizer Industry Authority
Agricultural Pesticides Institute of the Philippines 
U.S. Agency for International Development 
Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines 
National Grains Authority
Bureau of Cooperatives, Department of Local Government 
and Community Development
Department of Agrarian Reform
International Rice Research Institute
UPLB College of Agriculture
Philippine Constabulary
National Irrigation Administration
Bureau of Soils
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APPENDIX I
IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES
1. National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC)
The National Food and Agriculture Council coordinates all 
agencies directly and indirectly involved in the program, deposits 
funds to the Central Bank of the Philippines which are utilised for 
Special Time Deposits (STDs) with Rural Banks and Philippine National 
Bank, and prepares plans and programs in cooperation with other parti­
cipating agencies.
2. Bureau of Agricultural Extension (BAEx) and Bureau of Plant 
Industry (BPI)
These two Bureaus, under the Department of Agriculture, 
provide technical personnel in the provinces and municipalities. They 
coordinate the program planning, participate in the information drive, 
pest and disease regulatory and rat control programs and in applied 
research activities in cooperation with other agencies.
3. Central Bank of the Philippines (CB)
The Central Bank administers the funds for lending to parti­
cipating rural banks under the program, provides credit personnel, and 
simplifies lending procedures to speed up operations of the supervised 
credit scheme. The CB Department of Loans and Credit rediscounts all
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eligible papers under supervised credit at a rate not exceeding 1 per 
cent interest per year for rural banks and 3 per cent for Philippine 
National Bank.
4. Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines (REAP)
The REAP encourages more rural banks to participate in the 
Masagana 99 program. It assists in simplifying, expediting, and 
informing rural banks on the new procedures aimed at smooth operations.
5. Rural Banks (RBs)
The rural banks provide production loans to farmer-borrowers, 
arrange credit and marketing tie-up with the National Grains Authority 
(NGA) warehouse millers whenever feasible, participate in seed pro­
duction programs, and collect loans with the help of the production 
technicians. They provide incentive allowances to production techni­
cians supervising the M-99 program.
6. Philippine National Bank (PNB)
The Philippine National Bank provides production loans to 
- Jarmer-cooperators to complement loaning operations of the rural banks, 
participates in the information campaign, arranges whenever feasible 
credit and marketing tie-up with NGA warehouse millers, and helps in 
the collection of loans from the farmers. It provides incentive
allowances to technicians.
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7. Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA)
The ACA also provides loans to rice farmers or through the 
existing farmers cooperatives (FCs). It performs the same functions 
as the PNB and the rural banks in the information campaign and 
collection of loans from the farmers.
8. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
The USAID participates actively by providing the services 
of the Management Systems Advisors, Consultants, and Crop Production 
Specialists in the design, research, development, reporting and 
evaluation systems of the program.
9. National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
The Administration provides the list of farmers to be supplied 
with irrigation water during the period and provides the fieldmen to 
work with production technicians in the selection of farmer-cooperators.
It develops new irrigation systems and distributes irrigation pumps.
10. National Grains Authority (NGA)
The National Grains Authority provides marketing support to 
farmer-cooperators through its price support program and procurement 
scheme. It also participates actively in the information drive.
11. Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE)
The Bureau of Agricultural Economics assists in the monitoring, 
compilation, and analysis of provincial reports. It helps conduct program
evaluation in collaboration with the Management Information System 
(MIS) unit of the National Food and Agriculture Council.
12. Fertilizer Industry Authority (FIA)
The FIA is in charge of fertilizer allocation throughout the 
country particularly fertilizer requirements of the M-99 program in 
the target provinces.
13. Agricultural Pesticides Institute of the Philippines (APIP)
The APIP supplies pesticides and herbicides through accredited 
dealers of pesticides companies in the municipalities and barrios at 
standard prices.
14. National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
The NEDA lays down broad plans for the agricultural sector 
and provides the necessary funds support for the program.
15. UPLB College of Agriculture and International Rice Research Institute 
(UPLB, IRRI)
Both institutions conduct training for rice specialists and 
technicians. They help in providing technical guidance in the applica­
tion of packages of technology in the field. They put up micro-kits for 
demonstration to selected farmer-cooperators to serve as sources of new
seed varieties.
158
16. Bureau of Cooperatives, Department of Local Government and 
Community Development (DLGCD)
The Bureau of Cooperatives furnishes all rural banks, PNB, 
and ACA branches lists of registered samahang nayon (barrio associations) 
and their farmer-members. It facilitates the formation and organization 
of selda (joint liability groups) in the samahang nayon (barrio associa­
tions) .
17. Land Bank (LB)
The Land Bank provides the guarnatee fund for Masagana loans 
provided to farmers with the assistance of the Government Adjusters in 
the respective provinces.
18. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
The Agrarian Reform Department provides additional personnel 
as needed in the program, assists in the information drive and in the 
collection of loans from farmers.
19. Philippine Constabulary (PC)
The PC assists in the distribution of inputs by providing 
transport trucks as situation calls for and helps in the collection of loans.
20. Bureau of Soils
The Bureau of Soils provides technical personnel and conducts
soil analysis around the country.
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APPENDIX J
M-99 AREA DAMAGED BY TYPHOONS AND DROUGHT IN AUGUST 
AND OCTOBER, 1974
(1000 hectares)
Region/Province Area Planted Area Damaged % Areain Phase III in Phase III Damaged
ILOCOS REGION
1. Abra 7.0 2.7 39
2. Ilocos Norte 27.4 3.1 11
3. Ilocos Sur 29.6 24.5 83
4. La Union 23.4 3.6 15
5. Pangasinan 53.3 5.0 9
CAGAYAN VALLEY
6. Cagayan 19.6 7.0 36
7. Kalinga-Apayao 6.7 3.0 45
8. Nueva Viscaya 16.6 0.9 6
CENTRAL LUZON
9. Bataan 11.2 0.8 7
10. Pulacan 56.7 4.0 7
11. Nueva Ecija 125.8 19.4 15
12. Pampanga 71.9 9.8 14
13. Tarlac 67.9 5.0 7
14. Zambales 14.5 0.2 2
SOUTHERN TAGALOG
15. Batangas 12.7 0.1 1
16. Cavite 11.5 0.09 0.8
17. Laguna 28.5 1.0 3
18. Mindoro Occidental 22.6 0.8 4
19. Rizal 7.8 0.3 3
20. Palawan 8.0 0.01 0.1
BICOL REGION
21. Albay 21.4 0.2 1
22. Camarines Norte 8.0 0.3 4
WESTERN VISAYAS
23. Iloilo 103.5 0.1 0.1
24. Negros Oriental 25.5 3.0 12
SOUTHERN MINDANAO
2 5. Maguindanao 3.8 0.3 8
26. Sultan Kudarat 4.0 0.02 0.5
TOTAL 778.9 95.2 12.0
Source: Management Information System (MIS) reports.
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APPENDIX K
PRODUCTION, AREA, AND YIELD PER HECTARE OF PADDY, 
PHILIPPINES, CY 1949-50 TO CY 1975-76
_ 1 AreaCrop Year , .(Million Hectares)
Production 
(Million Cavans)*
Yield
(Cavans per Hectare)
1949-50 2.21 59.23 26.8
1950-51 2.25 59.46 26.4
1951-52 2.47 64.33 26.1
1952-53 2.65 71.46 26.9
1953-54 2.64 72.33 27.3
1954-55 2.65 72.79 27.4
1955-56 2.74 74.39 27.1
1956-57 2.77 76.04 27.5
1957-58 3.15 72.81 23.1
1958-59 3.33 83.74 25.2
1959-60 3.30 84.99 25.7
1960-61 3.20 84.20 26.3
1961-62 3.18 88.86 27.9
1962-63 3.16 90.16 28.5
1963-64 3.09 89.30 28.4
1964-65 3.20 90.74 28.4
1965-66 3.11 92.56 29.8
1966-67 3.10 93.05 30.1
1967-68 3.30 103.65 31.4
1968-69 3.33 101.01 30.3
1969-70 3.11 118.94 38.2
1970-71 3.11 121.43 39.0
1971-72 3.25 115.91 35.7
1972-73 3.11 100.33 32.2
1973-74 3.44 127.14 37.0
1974-75 3.54 128.64 36.4
1975-76 3.58 140.00 39.1
* A cavan is equal to 44 kilograms.
Sources: (1) Data from 1949 to 1960 taken from Venegas and Ruttan,
"An Analysis of Rice Production in the Philippines", 
International Rice Research Institute Journal Series 
No. 39, Published in Economic Research Journal 
(University of the East), Vol. XI, No. 3, December 
1964.
Data from 1961 to 1976 taken from Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, Department of Agriculture, Quezon City, 
Philippines.
(2)
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APPENDIX L
MASAGANA 99 LENDING RATE PER HECTARE IN PESOS3
Item CY 1973-74 CY 1974-75 CY 1975-76
Cash Portion
Land Preparation 300.00
Pulling of Seedlings
Transplanting
Baits/Baiting
Materials
3 bSeeds
30.00
Sub-Total 320.00 400.00 550.00
Input (Chit) Portion
Fertilizer
Chemicals
Rodenticides
Sub-Total 380.00 500,00 650.00
TOTAL 700.00 900.00 1200.00
a - If the farmer is a Samahang Nayon (Barrio Associations) member, 
an additional 5 per cent of his total loan releases is granted 
by the bank to cover his contribution to the Barrio Savings 
Fund (BSF).
b - The amount of loan for seeds can either be included in cash or
in input portion. Otherwise, the amount of seeds shall be a part 
of the cash portion.
APPENDIX M
LONG-TERM TREND OF RICE PRODUCTION, AREA AND YIELD IN THE PHILIPPINES
(1902-03 TO 1962-63)
19C2-CS
" ISS4-!5" ”ISf7'!0 1
1924-25 j i i T1934-35 i93&-39 1941-42 ^947^48 1334-£5 r
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Source: Venegas, E.C. and V.W. Ruttan, "An Analysis of Rice Production in the Philippines", IRRI Journal
Series No. 39, published in Economic Research Journal (University of the East), Vol. XI, No. 3,
December 1964.
" ! 502-03
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APPENDIX N
SET OF DUMMY VARIABLES USED IN COVARIANCE MODEL
Region Dummy Variables
1. Ilocos Region RD1
2. Cagayan Valley ^2
3. Central Luzon rd3
4. Southern Tagalog ^4
5. Bicol Region rd5
6. Western Visayas ^6
7. Central Visayas rd7
8. Eastern Visayas ^8
9. Western Mindanao ^9
10. Northern Mindanao roio
11. Southern Mindanao “>11
Time Dummy Variables
CY 1967-68 
CY 1968-69 
CY 1969-70 
CY 1970-71 
CY 1971-72 
CY 1972-73 
CY 1973-74
TD-
td2
TD3
TD4
TD5
TD..6
td7
TD8CY 1974-75
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APPENDIX 0
ESTIMATED COST OF THE MASAGANA 99 PROGRAM 
PHASES I, II AND III 
(in per ha.)
Point of View 
Phase
A. Government 
Direct Cost"1'
B. Whole Economy 
Direct & Indirect
I 152 217
II 189 309
III 206 373
TOTAL 186 311
1 Cost includes only credit subsidy, fertilizer subsidy, 
agricultural extension service, information campaign, and 
management coordination.
2 All of the above plus (a) net earnings foregone by the fertilizer 
industry and (b) opportunity cost of funds.
Source: Extracted from - Evangeline Javier, "Cost of the Masagana 99 
Program" (unpublished), March 1975.
